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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
People Construal: Social Categorization and Trait Evaluations of Visually Perceived Groups 
 
by 
 
Nicholas Peter Alt 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Kerri Johnson, Chair 
 
Our social world is populated by groups—students in classrooms, co-workers in teams, soldiers 
in platoons, and more. Social psychological research on person construal has established the 
processes and consequences of perceiving an individual, yet, we know less about our perception 
of groups. Here, I integrate person construal theory with vision science findings on ensemble 
perception to outline a framework of people construal, or how we make inferences and 
judgments about visually perceived groups. Overall, I propose that people construal relies on 
both social categories (e.g., a group’s gender ratio) and visual cues to within-category variability 
(e.g., facial masculinity or femininity). Study Set 1 examined whether perceivers were sensitive 
to a group’s gender ratio and whether this gender ratio impacted evaluative judgments. Studies 1 
and 2 showed that within a half second, perceivers were relatively accurate in estimating the 
number of men within a twelve-person group, and that as a group’s gender ratio shifted from 
men to women participants associated the group with more threat, measured both explicitly and 
 iii 
implicitly. Study 3 revealed that group threat evaluations were derived from participants 
perceived number of men and not inferences about men's perceived cohesiveness within the 
group. Study 4 underscored the influence of visual cues to men's gender typicality on group 
evaluations. Results showed that groups of masculine men, compared to feminine men, were 
rated as having more men and as more threatening. Study Set 2 shifted to questions of social 
category activation and social categorization. Study 5 revealed that group gender ratio and men’s 
gender typicality interacted to influence subsequent social category activation. Specifically, 
groups of majority masculine men facilitated activation of the category “man” to a greater degree 
than groups of majority feminine men. Study 6 revealed that participants categorized majority 
masculine men groups as “majority men” with higher accuracy and in a faster, more direct 
manner, compared to majority feminine men groups. Together, these results build a framework 
of people construal, advancing research beyond our perception of the individual to reveal 
insights into the role social categories and visual cues play in our perception of groups. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Take a moment and imagine a crowded sports arena. In your mind’s eye, you might conjure a 
fan cheering on their favorite team. Or a shirtless man with a large letter “L” written on his 
exposed belly. Or perhaps, the coach yelling about an unfair call. When you think “crowded”, 
however, these specific images are probably not what you first imagined. Instead, you likely 
conjured the mass of people wearing their team’s colors, the slightly skewed gender ratio of 
more men than women, or the angry emotional reaction of the fans after the unfair call. Much of 
person perception research has largely centered on the first set of impressions, those made about 
individual people. This focus, while vital to understanding how we come to perceive and make 
judgments about others, tells us less about the more common sight, that of individuals in groups. 
Indeed, our perceptual world is filled with people interacting with people—students in 
classrooms, protesters in the street, coworkers in work teams, and more. Thus, while groups are a 
foundational topic in social psychology, underlying a diverse array of research from intergroup 
relations (Heine, 2010; Richeson & Sommers, 2016; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010) to identity 
(Swann & Bosson, 2010; Tajfel, 1974), surprisingly little is known about visual people 
construal, or how we perceive groups and the downstream inferences we make about these group 
percepts.   
Social cognition, and in particular person construal research, has established an extensive 
body of work regarding the processes by which we perceive others—the integration of the visual 
percept (e.g., face/body) with social category knowledge (e.g., stereotypes) which comes to 
inform our judgments about others (for reviews see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Johnson, Lick, & 
Carpinella, 2015; Kawakami, Amodio, & Hugenberg, 2017; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; 
Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). While similar processes likely operate for groups, it is 
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important to acknowledge that groups, due to their complexity, pose a unique set of challenges. 
For instance, can we perceive social category differences within groups? Are our trait judgments 
of groups as a whole sensitive to social category variability within, and even more nuanced 
visual cue variation (e.g., gender typicality)? How do these factors, social category variability 
and visual cues, affect how we categorize groups? 
Social psychologists are starting to turn their eyes towards such questions pertaining to 
group perception and people construal (Phillips, Weisbuch, & Ambady, 2014). In large part, this 
interest is spurred by recent surprising findings from vision science on the phenomenon of 
ensemble perception: our ability to rapidly, and without much conscious attention, extract 
accurate summary statistics such as the mean and variance from a set of visually perceived 
objects (Alvarez, 2011; Whitney & Leib, 2018). Overall, by incorporating ensemble perception 
research with social psychological findings and theory, I am poised both in terms of 
methodology and extant literature, to advance our knowledge of how we perceive people.  
 In my dissertation, I outline a series of studies probing the processes and consequences of 
visual people construal, how we perceive groups of people and the downstream evaluative and 
social categorical judgments we make about such groups. To provide theoretical background, I 
begin by reviewing social psychology and vision science research, setting the stage to integrate 
these fields. In Chapter 2, I examine the extensive theory and research on person perception and 
person construal—that is how we visually perceive and represent single individuals. The 
empirical and theoretical insights from this area form the foundation for extrapolating beyond the 
individual to understand the group. In Chapter 3, I discuss findings on ensemble perception, 
highlighting how vision science approaches can inform our understanding of people construal, 
while also noting gaps within this work, notably the consequences of group perception as it 
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relates to social inferences and judgments. Finally, in Chapter 4, I outline a set of hypotheses 
related to people construal and propose a framework for advancing our theoretical and 
conceptual knowledge about group percepts and how we come to form judgments and 
evaluations about visually perceived groups. 
Chapter 2: Person Construal: Social Categorization and Social Vision 
 In building towards an integrated theory of people construal it is informative to review 
the literature on person construal. While many sensory processes underlie person construal, one 
dominant medium by which we experience others is sight, thus I will focus my review on how 
our visual perception of others (typically from the perception of faces and bodies) leads to our 
evaluations and judgments about others. Two key areas of research are critical to developing a 
people construal framework, namely the efficiency and pervasive use of social categories and the 
recent integration of early perceptual processes (e.g., visual cues) into person construal processes 
under the field of social vision.  
Social Categorization 
Our daily lives present us with the complex challenge of evaluating and inferring other 
people’s emotional states, motives, and intentions. One mechanism to alleviate this complexity is 
the use of social categories, which allow us to integrate previously learned knowledge with 
newly presented people. To this end, research on person perception has long focused on social 
categorization. In his seminal work, Allport (1954) argued that social categorization was an 
inevitable consequence of living in a complex social world and that social categories allowed us 
to, “…select and interpret our impressions of the surrounding world” (Allport, 1954, p. 165). In 
this vein, social categories serve us by reducing the cognitive effort of forming separate and 
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individuated impressions about each newly encountered person, as we apply and rely on learned 
associations, beliefs, and attitudes about the social categories to which a person belongs. 
Early researchers also argued that social categories, often studied with linguistic or 
semantic descriptions of people and groups (i.e., category labels like “men”, “French”, “White”), 
were the starting point for attitudinal differences about groups, engendering the potential for 
prejudice and discrimination (Allport, 1954; Heider, 1958; Warr & Knapper, 1968). With the 
subsequent integration of more cognitive processes such as attention, memory, and learning, 
social psychologists revealed the prescience of Allport’s (1954) position about the necessity and 
ease by which we think about others in terms of social categories (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1981). Indeed, an abundance of evidence 
suggested that we extract and apply social category information efficiently and automatically. 
For instance, results from semantic priming tasks showed that a “prime” stimulus could activate 
social category knowledge, subsequently impacting a “target” stimulus (e.g., the category label 
“Blacks” led to faster response times to stereotypical words such as “musical”; Dovidio, Evans, 
& Tyler, 1986). It is even the case that social categorical stimuli, presented below the threshold 
of conscious perception, still affects judgments in a manner consistent with stereotypes about the 
primed group (Devine, 1989; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). This 
research was further extended by results demonstrating that task relevance had minimal influence 
on social category activation. For example, in a lexical decision task, where the goal was 
irrelevant to the social category (i.e., is the target a word or not a word), facilitation for prime-
target word pairings (e.g., the word women and the word nurse) still emerged (Macrae, 
Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995). Evidence also accumulated suggesting that the use of stereotypes, 
activated from social categorical thinking, was deemed effective at reducing cognitive demands 
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and acted as an information consolidating tool. Indeed, in one study, researchers found that 
stereotypes allowed for better performance on a split attention task (i.e., monitoring audio and 
forming impressions from visually perceived labels, Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994). 
Across multiple studies and paradigms, results coalesced around the idea that we think in terms 
of social categories and that the stereotype activation which can arise from viewing others in 
such terms is a difficult to escape, default way of viewing others (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Hamilton, 1981). 
Still, the actual object of social categorization—the person—was largely absent from 
these early studies, a fact noted by Macrae and Bodenhausen (2000, p. 98), “…given Allport’s  
(1954) assertion that category activation follows the registration of a triggering stimulus—
specifically, another person—why is it that researchers have typically used verbal labels to 
investigate this process [social category activation].” Indeed, this challenge posed a serious issue 
to researchers. If I am studying the efficiency of social category activation regarding “women”, 
however, prime participants with the word “women”, did social categorization occur? To assess 
these questions, researchers needed to shift their investigations away from group labels and 
instead use visual cues of the person.  
Notably, a few studies tried to assess social categories without group labels. For example, 
the Who-Said-What memory paradigm was developed to tap the spontaneous use of social 
categories, thus highlighting the truly automatic nature by which social categories emerge. In 
these studies, participants learned a series of statements by speakers and were later given a 
surprise memory test in which they recalled which speaker said which statement. Results 
consistently demonstrated that participants made more within-category errors (e.g., confusing 
which of two women said the statement) compared to between-category errors (e.g., confusing 
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whether it was a man or a woman who said the statement). This pattern of results was taken as 
evidence that social categories were being used to guide memory and did not explicitly rely on 
the use of category labels (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass, 1992; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & 
Ruderman, 1978). While certainly evidence that social categories can arise spontaneously, these 
findings produced a roundabout way of assessing social categorization, first through learning, 
then memory, and finally recall (Klauer & Wegener, 1998). 
Buttressing this evidence for the automatic extraction of social category information from 
targets, social neuroscience findings suggest that early visual processing is attuned to social 
category differences extracted from faces. For example, electromyography (EEG) studies 
revealed that quickly after the visual presentation of a Black face (~170 ms), White participants 
showed different cortical activation or event-related potentials (ERPs) in visually oriented areas 
of the brain (Ito & Urland, 2003). Critically, African American participants also showed this 
same pattern but to White faces, suggesting ingroup/outgroup discrimination via race (Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2007). Similarly, functional brain imaging (fMRI) findings indicated that racial 
outgroup faces led to activation in the amygdala, an area of the brain associated with negative 
and threat-relevant stimuli (Lieberman, Hariri, Jarcho, Eisenberger, & Bookheimer, 2005). And 
yet, it was shown that participants attitudes and task relevance moderated amygdala activation, 
with those who held more positive racial attitudes or who viewed faces under conditions where 
race was not salient, having lower activation pattern differences between White and Black faces 
(Phelps et al., 2000; Wheeler & Fiske, 2005). Thus, while these studies demonstrated that social 
categories differentially affected early face processing outcomes, they also reflected the role of 
top-down influences such as task instruction or individual attitudes, in moderating these 
“uncontrolled” responses.   
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This non-exhaustive review of early social categorization research foregrounds the 
“cognitive miser” (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) approach to how we think about others—the fact that 
social categories offer a mental shortcut and in turn represent an efficient and inescapable part of 
person construal. Further, dual-process theories of person construal delineated how with 
sufficient attention and cognitive resources we may activate more nuanced processes of 
individuation, yet our default is to use social categories when little is known about the other or 
upon first encounter (Brewer & Feinstein, 1999; Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999). Applied to 
people construal, the lesson from early person construal research is that social categories will 
likely be a dominant characteristic of how we think about groups, and further that the social 
categories represented in a group will similarly activate knowledge structures such as stereotypes 
which will inform our trait and evaluative impressions of groups. These insights provide a 
foundation for understanding the operation of social categories within groups however a 
challenge for both person and people construal is how these social categories themselves arise, 
that is how does the act of social categorization occur given a particular person or group of 
people? 
Social Vision and Person Construal 
To address the challenge of how our visual perception of others translates into social 
categorization and subsequent activation of prior knowledge (i.e., stereotypes, individuating 
information, learned associations, etc.), a new theoretical framework and area of study 
emerged—social vision (Adams, Ambady, Nakayma, & Shimojo, 2011; Balcetis & Lassiter, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2015). Social vision sought to advance our theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the antecedent processes associated with social categorization; reframing past 
models to place social categorization not as the beginning of a long line of person construal 
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processes (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) but rather as a vital process in need of investigation itself. 
These principles were cogently argued and summarized in Freeman and Ambady (2011)’s 
Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person Construal, which explicitly linked bottom-up visual cues 
(e.g., features, skin tone) with top-down cognitive processes (e.g., stereotypes, attitudes) and 
placed these two factors in a dynamic and iterative process, with both influencing the ultimate 
social category judgment. Borrowing theories from cognitive psychology, Freeman and Ambady 
(2011) developed a dynamic connectionist network model, in which visual cues provide stimulus 
input which in turn competitively activate different social categories. As these social categories 
become activated, top-down processes such as motivations come online which enhance or 
dampen excitatory connections across potential social category options. Importantly, these 
connections iteratively compete over time, until a stable social category judgment emerges.   
Furthermore, Freeman and Ambady (2011), and social vision more broadly, situated 
social categorization in terms of its more proximal reasons for being, derived from the ecological 
theory of social perception (McArthur & Baron, 1983). Building on even earlier ideas from 
Gibson (1986), it was argued that our visual perception is largely driven by functionality, thus 
social percepts are viewed in terms of affordances which allow us to make inferences about 
perceived targets. Foregrounding this concept renewed interest in understanding person 
perception from the standpoint of why our perceptions matter, providing an essential lens for the 
functional purpose of our everyday judgments and decisions about others.1 Additionally, in 
acknowledging the temporal dynamics, the Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person Construal 
                                               
1 Indeed, a quick review of google scholar citations shows that McArthur & Baron (1983) has 
been cited more than 1,016 times, yet most of these citations come between 2000 and 2018 (647) 
compared to 1983-1999 (362).  
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theorizes that our judgments can rapidly and efficiently update with changes in our social 
environment (e.g., momentary facial expressions). 
Another key insight from this model is the influence of top-down factors, giving weight 
to our motivations and the social context in which we perceive others. For instance, we might 
view a person’s gender, whether someone is categorized as a man or a woman, differently 
depending on whether it is dark and we are alone or fearful (Johnson, Iida, & Tassinary, 2012). 
In this case, informed by insights from Error Management Theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000) 
seemingly irrational biases in social categorization make more “rational” sense, as it is better to 
err on the side of caution since, on average, men represent greater threat than women (Archer, 
2004). Overall, the Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person Construal positioned social 
categorization not as the starting point but rather as an entire process itself, affected by 
contextual and motivational factors and in need of exploration. 
Two specific themes from social vision and models like the Dynamic Interactive Theory 
of Person Construal are relevant to my proposal of people construal: 1) the impact of within-
category variability (e.g., racial phenotype/gender typicality) on social categorization outcomes 
and evaluative judgments, and 2) the fact that stimuli features (e.g., hairstyle, gendered cues) 
alone can compel and even override social categorization processes. The rest of this chapter is 
devoted to discussing and reviewing literature on these factors.   
Visual Cues to Within-Category Variability and Person Construal 
Monolithic categories lend themselves to the thinking that there is only one prototypical 
exemplar. For instance, asking participants to read the label “Black Person” evokes the image of 
an individual with specific features that match a prototype (e.g., a dark-skinned person, likely a 
man). We know, however, that racial categorization often others those who only look marginally 
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different (Maddox, 2004). Across multiple studies, and a variety of social categories, researchers 
have found that this within-category variability in visual cues profoundly influences person 
construal processes. For instance, Blair, Judd, Sadler, and Jenkins (2002) demonstrated that a 
target’s visually perceived degree of Afrocentricity (e.g., the degree to which one has 
stereotypical features of a Black person) produced strikingly different outcomes in terms of 
stereotyping and category accessibility, with high Afrocentric targets evoking greater stereotype 
activation and category facilitation. Maddox and Gray (2002) also found, using a Who-Said-
What paradigm, that perceivers extracted and utilized skin tone in a similar manner as social 
categories, with more within-“group” (i.e., dark skin tone) than between-“group” (i.e., dark and 
light skin tones) errors. Together, these findings presented a formidable argument for effects of, 
and need to account for, within-category differences in visual cues.  
Follow-up studies on Afrocentric phenotypic cues continued to reveal the highly 
consequential real-world impact that these visual cues have on social categorization outcomes. 
Researchers found that highly phenotypic Black men received harsher criminal sentences and a 
higher proportion of death sentences compared to less phenotypic Black men (Blair, Judd, & 
Chapleau, 2004; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006). Even the visual 
assessment of physical size was tethered to the degree of Afrocentricity within the face, with 
people who had more Afrocentric features viewed as more formidable (Wilson, Hugenberg, & 
Rule, 2017). 
Beyond race, the influence of within-category cue variability to gender (i.e., masculinity 
and femininity) also greatly affects person construal and downstream trait judgments. While not 
visual in nature, Deaux and Lewis (1984) noted that when sex (i.e., male and female) and gender 
typicality (i.e., whether someone is masculine or feminine) were crossed, gender typicality was 
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predictive of other social categories (i.e., gay or straight) and gendered traits. This interactive 
influence of sex and gender typicality afforded novel insights into the construal of a feminine 
man or a masculine woman. Specific to the face, Friedman and Zebrowitz (1992) demonstrated 
that manipulating men’s faces to appear more babyfaced, (i.e., large eyes and a higher forehead 
to chin ratio) and women’s faces to appear less babyfaced, flipped gender typical trait ratings 
(i.e., men were rated more warm and caring, and women more dominant). Facial gender 
typicality was also tethered to ratings of dominance and leadership, with more masculine looking 
men and women rated higher on these traits than feminine looking men and women (Sczesny, 
Spreemann, & Stahlberg, 2006). 
Other facial sexually dimorphic cues can also vary within gender. For instance, facial 
width to height ratio (fWHR) is a structural cue to the face measured by dividing face width 
(e.g., the distance from ear to ear) by face height (e.g., the distance from the upper lip to the 
upper eyelid). Numerous studies have shown that across both real photos where fWHR is 
measured, and digital images where fWHR is manipulated, perceivers consistently rate high 
fWHR individuals as more masculine, as well as more aggressive, threatening, and physically 
formidable than low fWHR individuals (Carré, McCormick, & Mondloch, 2009; Geniole, 
Denson, Dixson, Carré, & McCormick, 2015; Geniole, Molnar, Carré, & McCormick, 2014; 
Třebický, Fialová, Kleisner, & Havlíček, 2016; Zilioli et al., 2015). Overall, a recent meta-
analysis found a relatively strong average correlation between threat perceptions and 
unmanipulated faces (r = .46) and a small-to-medium correlation for manipulated faces (d 
= .41), supporting the notion that perceivers use fWHR variability to assess threat judgments 
(Geniole, Denson, Dixson, Carré, & McCormick, 2015).  
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 In summary, across social categories (e.g., race and gender), visual cues to within-
category variability (e.g., race and gender typicality) produced different outcomes in relation to 
person construal processes, both forming their own category subsets (Maddox & Gray, 2002) 
and shifting evaluative judgments (Friedman & Zebrowitz, 1992; Geniole et al., 2015). A critical 
insight from social vision models was the explicit goal of examining the impact of these visual 
cue differences (Johnson et al., 2015). I argue that such within-category variability likely also 
informs our understanding of people construal, with important downstream consequences for the 
evaluations of groups. 
The Impact of Visual Feature Cues on Social Categorization  
The fact that visual cues to within-category variability produced different outcomes 
associated with social category activation and stereotyping (Blair et al., 2002; Blair et al., 2004; 
Friedman & Zebrowitz, 1992; Livingston & Brewer, 2002; Sczesny et al., 2006) led researchers 
to question the role of visual features themselves, both how they engendered social judgments 
and category activation and whether they alone were sufficient to activate social categories (e.g., 
priming). Early evidence for the differential effects of visual feature cues on social 
categorization, emerged from percepts of the body. Prior work on walk-motion, displayed via 
point-light walkers, found that these stimuli were sufficient to compel accurate sex 
categorization (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977). However, percepts of the body provide multiple 
cues from which sex categorizations can emerge such as walk motion and body morphology (i.e., 
waist-to-hip ratio). Johnson and Tassinary (2005) investigated these cues in combination and 
found that perceivers mostly derived their sex categorization judgments from morphology rather 
than body motion. Indeed, visual attention was focused on the waist-to-hip ratio when making 
sex categorization judgments, and this focus was dramatically reduced when participants were 
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explicitly told the sex of the walker. Critically, however, walk motion informed judgments of 
gender typicality, which in turn mediated sex categorizations. Thus, accurate sex categorization 
from walk motion likely arose from inferred judgments related to gender typicality (i.e., the 
walker looks masculine, and thus must be a man). These findings show that visual cues play a 
vital role in social categorization judgments and that categorization does not arise spontaneously 
in a discrete unambiguous fashion but rather relies on lower-level visual cues (Johnson & 
Freeman, 2010).  
Similar findings that visual features alone can impact social categorization judgments 
also emerged for percepts of race. Specifically, MacLin and Malpass (2001) demonstrated that 
race categorization varied as a function of hairstyle cues. In their study, they generated 
ambiguous faces that overlapped in facial cues to the categories Hispanic and Black. They found 
that applying different hairstyles to the same face, compelled perceivers to categorize the face as 
either “Hispanic” or “Black”. More striking, results indicated that participants reported that faces 
with a “Black” hairstyle had a darker complexion, even though visual cues to luminance were 
held constant. These findings demonstrated that a single feature—hairstyle—dramatically 
influenced visual perception and social categorization of a target. Taking these findings a step 
further, Levin and Banaji (2006) presented participants with faces that were equal in luminance 
however morphed along a continuum of Black and White facial features. When viewing these 
stimuli, a compelling visual illusion emerged, whereby White morphed faces were perceived as 
significantly lighter than Black morphed faces, even though luminance was unchanged. Again, 
facial features affected how we perceive others. By explicitly modeling these factors—sensory 
input providing the basis for varied social category activation (e.g., Black versus Hispanic) and 
top-down influences (e.g., prior experience of seeing specific hairstyles on Black individuals and 
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Hispanic individuals) leading to different category judgments—social vision models argued 
against social categorization being a one and done process and instead saw social categorization 
as a dynamic, iterative, and motivated process that could lead to varied yet predictable category 
judgments.   
 The studies above revealed the role visual features played in both trait and category 
judgments about others, however stopped short of testing whether visual features alone could 
activate social category knowledge. Given MacLin and Malpass (2001)’s finding that hair cues 
could shift category judgments, it is not surprising that researchers sought to test whether this 
feature, by itself, could elicit category activation. In a series of studies, Macrae and Martin 
(2007) found that this was the case. In a sequential priming task, they demonstrated that hairstyle 
cues alone were sufficient to activate gender categories (i.e., short hair facilitated “men” category 
activation, long hair facilitated “women” category activation). Furthermore, they crossed 
hairstyle with actual gender of the face, producing congruent and incongruent pairings (i.e., men 
with long hair and women with short hair) while also manipulating prime duration: short (200 
ms) or long (20 ms). Results showed that, at the long prime duration, hairstyle cues overrode the 
actual gender of the face, with men with long hair and women with short hair priming the 
“incorrect” category, women and men respectively. Overall, these studies demonstrated that 
visual features, under certain constraints such as a brief glance, produced faulty category 
activation. 
 While Macrae and Martin (2007)’s finding suggested that social category activation was 
misled by visual features (i.e., hairstyle), we often do not see individuals for a mere 20 ms. Their 
results also belie the fact that we generally are very accurate with gender categorizations, 
especially when given sufficient viewing time (Wild et al., 2000). In reconciling these issues, 
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social vision models of person construal (Freeman & Ambady, 2010; Johnson & Freeman, 2010) 
articulate that social categorization is an iterative process, that continually updates. In this way, 
even though the final categorization (e.g., that person is man or a woman) is generally accurate, 
it may be that our decision process unfolds different depending on visual cues such as 
masculinity and femininity. To investigate this idea, Freeman, Ambady, Rule, and Johnson 
(2008), had participants make gender categorization judgments from stimuli that again crossed 
hairstyle cues with gender, as well as stimuli morphed to be more masculine or feminine. Unique 
to their design, participants made gender categorization decisions by moving a computer mouse 
to select one of two categories presented on opposite ends of the screen, and their mouse 
movements were tracked. Results for both hairstyle and morphed faces revealed that while the 
ultimate categorization was generally correct, participants mouse movements were, on average, 
attracted to the incorrect gender category label when categorizing incongruent hairstyle cues 
(i.e., men with long hair, women with short hair) and when faces were gender atypical (i.e., 
feminine men, masculine women). Similar findings were demonstrated for race categorizations 
where stereotypic gender associations were mismatched (i.e., Asian men, Black women, 
Johnson, Freeman, & Pauker, 2012) and racial phenotypicality (Freeman, Pauker, Apfelbaum, & 
Ambady, 2010). Thus, while isolated visual cues to a particular social category (e.g., gender 
typicality) were not necessarily enough to prompt incorrect social categorization (e.g., a feminine 
man is still categorized as a man), recording how the categorization process unfolded over time 
revealed patterns of incorrect category activation due to mismatched visual cues.  
Person Construal and Its Implications for People Construal 
Since social psychology’s inception researchers have focused on groups as central to the 
human psyche, particularly as the starting point for stereotyping and more nefarious processes 
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like prejudice and discrimination (Allport, 1954). Indeed, when we encounter another individual, 
we automatically and efficiently activate social categories to which they belong which affects 
our downstream explicit and implicit judgments about them (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; 
Bodenhausen, 1988; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). While this early work largely used 
semantic labels to denote groups, the person eventually made a return to person perception 
(Zebrowitz, 2006), however this posed a series of new challenges and questions (Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). By investigating social categorization as a process itself, rather than just 
the beginning of stereotyping and prejudice, it became clear that social categorization was not a 
discrete all-or-nothing judgment (Johnson & Freeman, 2010) rather visual cues from the face and 
body served as bottom-up input which in turn activated a multitude of social categories. Further, 
top-down cognitive structures such as attitudes, stereotypes, and prior experience could moderate 
categorization (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). In this sense, person construal resulted from 
numerous processes that could, in turn, account for research findings regarding within-category 
visual cue variability and feature-level determinants of social categorization. This paradigm shift, 
from thinking about social categorization as the starting point to viewing it as a product of 
dynamic and interactive bottom-up and top-down influences, created a more holistic and 
generalizable model of person construal. 
Still, the dominance of person perception processes meant that single individuals were 
often the focus of attention. My dissertation purposes to shift this focus, examining people and 
building a theory of how social categories and visual cues impact people perception (Phillips et 
al., 2014). Person construal research provides the foundation for understanding which processes 
likely impact group perception, highlighting questions such, as can we visually perceive social 
categories within groups (i.e., a group’s gender ratio)? Does this perception lead to judgments 
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related to gender stereotype associations (e.g., more men in a group should increase the overall 
threat rating of the group)? And lastly, what role does within-group variability (e.g., gender 
typicality) play in these judgments and social category activation? Before outlining how I will 
test these questions, it is first important to review research from a domain outside of social 
psychology—cognitive vision science findings on a phenomenon known as ensemble perception 
(Alvarez, 2011; Whitney & Leib, 2018). 
Chapter 3: The Visual Perception of Groups 
 Vision scientists have long been interested in how perceive and represent ensembles, or 
sets of objects. While we can intuit multiple instances when we see and make inferences about 
groups, the act of visually perceiving a group offers a provocative challenge to assumptions 
underlying limitations to vision and cognition. For instance, researchers have noted that we are 
unable to attend to and represent each individual item we perceive, with findings suggesting that 
adults can hold in mind information for about three to four objects (Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; 
Luck & Vogel, 1997). This four-item limitation exists for a variety of phenomenon including 
change blindness (Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 2000; Simons & Chabris, 1999), object-tracking 
(Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999), and feature representation (Luck & Vogel, 1997). Yet, such a 
limitation is inconsistent with how we perceive and interact with our world and would represent 
a severe disadvantage to our perceptual and cognitive capabilities. Within the past ten years, 
there is a growing recognition in vision science that we overcome these limitations by processing 
and representing visual information in terms of summary statistical properties, leading to 
research on the phenomenon of ensemble perception.  
Ensemble Coding: Low-Level Effects 
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 To answer questions of how we overcome the constraints of our sensory and cognitive 
systems, early observations by Gestalt theorists acknowledged that our visual experience extends 
beyond simply the individual features we perceive (Wertheimer, 1938). These insights provided 
a foundation for understanding how the interaction between sensory input and cognition gives 
breadth to our visual experience. Much later, psychophysical research demonstrated that we 
could average across low-level visual features, such as speed (Watamaniuk & Duchon, 1992) 
and motion (Williams & Sekuler, 1984), which reduced the need to perceive, and represent, each 
object individually, as the average became the single percept.  
Subsequent work on this averaging phenomenon spawned the study of ensemble 
perception (also know was ensemble coding, or summary representation) defined as: “the idea 
that the visual system naturally represents sets of similar items using summary 
statistics…serv[ing] as a computationally inexpensive means of obtaining valuable information 
about a scene” (Haberman & Whitney, 2012, p. 2) or simply put, the ability to extract visual 
summary statistical properties (e.g., mean, variance) from sets or groups of objects (Alvarez, 
2011). An early demonstration of this effect emerged from the surprising finding that when 
shown an array depicting a multitude of different sized circles, participants were accurate in 
reporting the mean size of all the circles; yet when asked whether a particular circle was in the 
array participants were inaccurate (Ariely, 2001). These findings were evidence against previous 
propositions that when presented with multiple stimuli, the brain represents each at a low-
resolution (Nakayama, 1990). Follow-up studies further highlighted the automaticity and 
efficiency of extracting ensemble perceptions, as accuracy in size detection remained high even 
with limited exposure duration (50 ms), memory delays (2000 ms), and different in circle size 
distributions: uniform, bimodal, and normal compared to homogenous (Chong & Treisman, 
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2003). Work also demonstrated that ensemble perception was not limited to mean or average 
percepts as variance could also be extracted and reported (Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). 
Vision scientists demonstrated similar effects across a host of stimuli including size (Chong & 
Treisman, 2003); line orientation (Dakin & Watt, 1997); spatial location (Alvarez & Oliva, 
2008); and number (Halberda, Sires, & Feigenson, 2006). Overall, this research pointed to our 
visual system’s profound flexibility in extracting the gist or summary of a group of stimuli, 
offering a parsimonious explanation to long established cognitive and visual limitations. 
Social Ensemble Coding 
Critical to social psychology, vision scientists moved beyond low-level visual stimuli to 
investigate whether high-level visual characteristics vital to social processes (e.g., emotions, 
social categories, and identities) could also be extracted and accurately depicted via ensemble 
perception. In an early demonstration using more socially-relevant stimuli, Haberman and 
Whitney (2007) showed participants could distinguish the mean facial emotion (happy-sad and 
neutral-disgust) for groups of four and sixteen faces; even though participants could not 
discriminate individual faces in the group. They further demonstrated that this same effect 
emerged for gender, with faces morphed across a single male and female identity. Similar to 
low-level features, equivalent findings were shown for presentation times as low as 50 ms (Jason 
Haberman & Whitney, 2009) as well as percepts of variance and not just mean (Haberman, Lee, 
& Whitney, 2015)  
As with low-level ensemble perception, a plethora of research revealed that accurate 
summary representations could be formed for a range of socially-relevant stimuli including 
point-light walkers heading direction (Sweeny, Haroz, & Whitney, 2013), eye gaze (Sweeny & 
Whitney, 2014), race (Thornton, Srismith, Oxner, & Hayward, 2014), humanness (Leib, 
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Kosovicheva, & Whitney, 2016), head rotation (Florey, Clifford, Dakin, & Mareschal, 2016) and 
identity (J. de Fockert & Wolfenstein, 2009). Furthermore, researchers found that participants 
could accurately report whether a four-person group had more or less variability in terms of 
gender, race, and facial dominance compared to another four-person group (Phillips, Slepian, & 
Hughes, 2018). 
Beyond additional demonstrations of ensemble perception’s ubiquity, researchers sought 
to define its underlying mechanism and processes. For instance, while ensemble perception relies 
on forming a mean of visually perceived stimuli, perceivers do not appear to subsample specific 
parts of the array to make their judgments. The evidence supporting this assertion rests on the 
fact that perceivers discounted extreme emotional deviants from their summary representation 
(Haberman & Whitney, 2010); an effect also demonstrated for size perception (Brady & Alvarez, 
2011). If sub-sampling was the mechanism by which ensemble perception operated, the single 
emotional deviant should sway some participants’ judgments, however, accuracy remained high 
across all trials no matter where the deviant was placed (Haberman & Whitney, 2010).   
It was also posited that ensemble perception operates via separate mechanisms for lower 
and higher level stimuli, as individuals’ performance on ensemble tasks highly correlated within 
lower and higher level domains (e.g., high correlations between color and line orientation; 
emotion and identity) but not across lower and higher domains (e.g., emotion and line 
orientation) (Haberman, Brady, & Alvarez, 2015). Additionally, ensemble perception for faces is 
sensitive to face specific processing disruption, with performance severely hampered for inverted 
faces (Haberman & Whitney, 2009; Torralba & Oliva, 2003). Lastly, it appears that ensemble 
perception emerges early in human development, with infants as young as eight months able to 
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store, and subsequently detect changes in up to three different ensembles (Zosh, Halberda, & 
Feigenson, 2011).  
In gaining a better understanding of the mechanisms associated with ensemble 
perception, three critical areas have garnered intense focus and research: 
consciousness/awareness, attention, and memory. As with research on person perception, the 
interplay between cognitive factors and vision helps to establish the precise mechanisms 
associated with ensemble perception and opens broader theoretical questions (Whitney & Leib, 
2018). Since this review focuses more on socially relevant stimuli I will devote primary attention 
to studies that used such stimuli, however, note that much of this work has also been 
demonstrated with low-level features. 
A tenant of ensemble perception is that this process arises without conscious awareness 
(Whitney & Leib, 2018). Haberman and Whitney (2007) first demonstrated this effect when they 
found that perceivers, while accurate in reporting the average emotion of a group (whether the 
test face was happier or sadder than the mean of the group), were at chance in recognizing which 
out of two faces was actually in the set. A follow-up investigation found that disgust faces, 
presented outside of awareness, still influenced the perceived mean emotion of disgust 
(Haberman & Whitney, 2007). In addition, utilizing a crowding technique, in which a center face 
was flanked by six others to make it perceptually unrecognizable, researchers showed that the 
center face impacted the ensemble representation, even though the face itself was undetectable 
(Fischer & Whitney, 2011). In a further demonstration of awareness and ensemble perceptions, 
Haberman and Whitney (2011) presented perceivers with two successive 4x4 arrays composed of 
faces that varied in terms of happy and sad emotions. In the second array, four faces switched 
emotional extremes. Perceivers, when asked which array was happier (an ensemble percept) 
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were above chance (~70%), however, when asked to locate any of the four faces which changed, 
perceivers were at chance. This demonstration of ensemble perception even though change 
blindness occurred, furthered the argument that conscious awareness of individual items was 
unnecessary for accurate ensemble perception.  
A second significant facet of ensemble perception is its seeming independence from 
visual attention. Initial evidence showed robust ensemble percepts even when attention was 
divided. For instance, Chong and Treisman (2005) found that perceivers who viewed arrays 
consisting of circles of different sizes and colors were able to accurately report both cued 
characteristics (e.g., what is the average circle size of the set) and surprise non-cued 
characteristics (e.g., what was the average color of the circles). This effect also appeared across 
sensory modalities, with both visual and auditory ensemble perception emerging at the same time 
(Albrecht, Scholl, & Chun, 2012). Recent work, however, suggests that divided attention reduces 
the precision and efficacy of ensemble perception, with worse performance in an attentional 
blink paradigm (Brand, Oriet, & Sykes Tottenham, 2012; McNair, Goodbourn, Shone, & Harris, 
2017). Overall, it has been argued that this question of whether ensemble perception requires or 
does not require visual attention is too limiting, with calls to investigate how visual attention 
interacts with ensemble perception to influence accuracy (Whitney & Leib, 2018). 
In this vein, intriguing findings emerged from studies where visual attention was cued to 
particular items within an ensemble. In one of the first studies investigating cuing, Chong and 
Treisman (2003) showed that mean size perception was more accurate, (i.e., had a smaller 
threshold for 80% accuracy), when visual attention was global rather than cued, suggesting that 
approaching ensemble perception with a holistic attentional framework is advantageous. Other 
researchers showed that signaling attention to a particular circle within an array could bias 
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overall average size estimates to that circle’s size (de Fockert & Marchant, 2008), underscoring 
the effects of individuating attention to particular items within sets.  
Attention can also be manipulated via less invasive cueing, with foveal, or center, versus 
peripheral placement of stimuli within an array biasing ensemble perception. For example, center 
presented faces in an emotion detection task were weighted to a higher degree when assessing 
the mean emotion (Ji, Chen, & Fu, 2014). Recent work also suggests exciting possibilities 
regarding directed visual attention and summary representations of race. Jung, Bülthoff, and 
Armann (2017) showed arrays of faces, composed of faces morphed to vary between two Asian 
and White faces, and tested whether faces at the center of a 3x4 array influenced summary 
representations of average race more than faces at the visual periphery. Results indicated 
accurate ensemble perception for the whole array, however, faces presented at the center were 
given more weight in the overall summary representation as demonstrated by performance data 
matching ideal observer models derived from taking into account only the two center faces. In a 
methodologically rigorous test of visual attention and ensemble perception, Wolfe, Kosovicheva, 
Leib, Wood and Whitney (2015) showed that when center viewed faces (measured via eye-
tracking) were occluded in real time (i.e., whenever participants eye-gaze focused on them), 
ensemble perception remained accurate. Overall, these findings suggest intriguing possibilities 
that visual attention directed at the center of arrays, while not wholly accounting for summary 
representations, affects ensemble summations more than periphery percepts. 
One final cognitive process related to ensemble perception is memory. Researchers have 
noted that ensemble perception can also occur for stimuli presented in rapid succession rather 
than all at once (however primacy and recency effects influence the summary perception, 
Hubert-Wallander & Boynton, 2015). This sequential presentation effect underscores ensemble 
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perception’s potential role in visual and working memory (Haberman, Harp, & Whitney, 2009; 
Brady & Alvarez, 2011). An interesting extension of this is Ying and Xu (2017), who found that 
visual adaptation aftereffects emerged for emotional faces presented via rapid serial visual 
presentation. Participants viewed ten different faces all expressing a single emotion (either happy 
or sad) sixteen times (for a total of 160 face presentations) in the span of approximately 3.7 
seconds—developing a summary perception of the faces. After, when asked whether a single 
face was happy or sad participants showed point of subjective equality shifts dependent on which 
visual adaptation condition they were in (e.g., if adapted to happy faces, they perceived happy 
expressions less). This study provides further evidence that we adapt to the multitude of faces we 
see in any particular environment, with important implications for people perception. 
In summary, the explosive growth of research in ensemble perception underscores the 
importance of our visual system’s profound flexibility in extracting the gist or summary of a 
group of stimuli. Of crucial significance, ensemble perception offers a parsimonious and 
poignant counter to long-established cognitive and visual limitations, greatly expanding the four-
item limit by allowing for items to be defined not as single objects but rather as groups. 
Furthermore, the early development, automaticity, and limited need for attentional resources, 
suggests that ensemble perception is a powerful mental capability related to perceiving our social 
world and the groups of people within it. Questions, however, remain. Specifically, how 
ensemble perception informs downstream social judgments about groups and what more socially 
relevant factors influence our group percepts. Overall, the integration of social psychology 
theory with ensemble perception opens the potential for numerous important and critical insights 
into people construal.  
Chapter 4: People Construal: Integrating Person and Ensemble Perception  
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In Chapter 2, I reviewed the extensive literature on person perception, and its focus on 
understanding how social categories underlie the inferences and social evaluations we make 
about others. This area of research examined the “person” via semantic labels and single faces or 
bodies, leaving the large visual landscape of “people” untouched. For my dissertation I propose 
to explore this landscape, focusing on our visual perception of groups and the inferences we 
draw about these group percepts. Vision science research on ensemble perception provides a 
strong foundation for developing this perspective. Researchers demonstrated that for both low- 
and high-level stimuli, we as observers can form accurate summary representations (e.g., mean 
and variance). Building upon this foundation, I interrogate processes associated with our ability 
to visually perceive social categories within groups and how these social categories inform the 
inferences we make about the group as a whole; advancing our theoretical and empirical 
knowledge of people construal.   
Across six studies, I address three distinct but interrelated questions. In Study Set 1 I 
examined whether perceivers were sensitive, after a brief visual presentation (500 ms), to group 
social category variability in terms of gender (men or women). In three studies, I manipulated the 
gender ratio of twelve-person groups and asked participants for numeric estimations of the 
number of men within the group as well as overall trait judgments about the group. These trait 
judgments focused on a critical evaluative domain—threat. Indeed, understanding whether a 
group represents a hostile or hospitable entity is a vital evaluative inference directly impacting 
our survival and safety (Boyer, Firat, & Leeuwen, 2015). Groups have long been the actors and 
instigators of some of the worst and deadliest conflicts, and pose higher threat, such as an 
elevated capacity to inflict damage, compared to a single individual (Schaller & Neuberg, 2008). 
While past research reveals numerous cues by which we come to evaluate others regarding their 
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imposed threat (e.g., physical formidability, past success, emotional signals, and social 
categories, Archer, 2004; Holbrook & Fessler, 2013; Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2011) little 
research has investigated our perceptions of threat from visually perceived groups. 
Furthermore, theoretical and empirical insights predict that as a group’s gender ratio 
shifts from more women to more men, the group will be rated as more threatening. Consistent 
evidence across multiple fields of study, indicates that men, compared to women, enact more 
violence against others. For instance, archeologists found that mass graves of bodies that showed 
signs of violent deaths (e.g., injuries sustained by weapons or blunt blows), contained 
exclusively or mostly bodies of men (Boucherie, Jørkov, & Smith, 2017). Additionally, historical 
overviews and sociological findings often note that men, compared to women, comprise more 
causalities in warfare (Goldstein, 2003), are more likely to be the victims of homicide 
(Kellermann & Mercy, 1992) and make up the bulk of arrests for violent crimes (Pastore & 
Maguire, 2005). Collectively, these patterns strongly suggest that men are overall more 
associated with violent behavior than women (Archer, 2004). These gender differences in 
aggression are further reinforced by cultural norms and beliefs, effectively creating a feedback 
loop whereby men are expected to be more aggressive and violent compared to women, a factor 
contributing to this difference (Frieze & Li, 2010; Wood & Eagly, 2002). In summary, there is 
strong support for the assertion that a group’s overall threat rating should be affected by the 
number of men within the group. 
 Overall, by integrating insights from vision science to examine socially relevant 
inferences about with groups, I propose three general hypotheses for Study Set 1: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants will be sensitive to the number of men within briefly 
presented (500 ms), visually perceived, groups. 
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Hypothesis 2: Social evaluations of groups will track group gender ratio, 
such that as the number of men in a group increases (and the number of 
women decreases), group threat/hostility judgments will increase. 
Furthermore, as the number of men in a group increases, ratings of 
warmth/invitingness will decrease. 
 
Hypothesis 3: This pattern of threat evaluations should hold for more 
implicit measures, such that majority men groups, when used as primes 
within the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP), will engender 
subsequently presented unrelated stimuli to be judged as more threatening. 
 
Study Set 1 thus provides a foundation for subsequent research by demonstrating that perceivers 
are sensitive to a groups’ gender ratio and that this sensitivity informs social evaluative 
judgments about groups as a whole. 
 In Study 4, I seek to understand whether visual cues to within-category variability (i.e., 
gender typicality) modulate Study Set 1 results. In particular, I focus on how visual cues to 
men’s facial masculinity and femininity influence group evaluations in terms of social category 
perception and social evaluations. Related to social vision researchers’ findings on the effects of 
within-category visual cue variability (Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Johnson et al., 2015; Maddox 
& Perry, 2017), I believe similar aggrandizement of threat inferences should emerge for groups 
composed of masculine compared to feminine men. These results would demonstrate that 
perceivers are sensitive not only a group’s gender ratio but also visual characteristics (i.e., facial 
masculinity and femininity) within groups. Overall, for Study 4, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: The effects found in Study Set 1 will be stronger for groups 
that contain faces of masculine compared to feminine men.  
 
That is, groups with masculine men, compared to feminine men, should 
produce higher numeric estimates of the number of men, higher threat 
ratings, and higher overall estimates of group gender typicality (a new 
measure added to Study 4). 
 
To examine these questions, I developed images using face morphing software which allows for 
precise control over the degree of masculinity and femininity of the men’s faces. Evidence in 
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support of these hypotheses would further extend our knowledge of people construal, situating 
this phenomenon in terms of how visual inputs affect group perception akin to person construal 
processes (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). 
 Finally, in Study Set 2, I assess how gender typicality moderates social category 
decisions about groups. A critical question regarding people construal is whether and how social 
categories become activated following a group percept. While evidence suggests that group 
percepts do evoke social category activation, and to an even stronger degree than single faces 
(see Cooley & Payne, 2017), no prior research has directly assessed the interactive effects of 
social categories (i.e., gender) and within-category variability (i.e., gender typicality) on social 
category activation from groups. I investigate this question using two social cognitive research 
paradigms, the sequential priming task and mouse-tracking. 
For the sequential priming task, I borrow methods from Macrae and Martin (2007) who 
found that by using a short prime duration, 20 ms versus 200 ms, visual features (i.e., hairstyle 
cues) activated incorrect gender category information, overriding the social category itself (i.e., 
women with short hair facilitated faster reaction times to men’s names compared to women’s 
names). To disentangle the effects of visual cues (i.e., gender typicality) and social categories 
(i.e., majority men or women groups) I use a similar sequential priming task, with participants 
viewing group arrays composed of majority men (masculine or feminine) and majority women 
(no gender typicality cue manipulated) as primes, followed by a target face for which they make 
a gender categorization (man or woman). I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5: When prime duration is short (200 ms), compared to long 
(1000 ms), participants should utilize visual cue information. Specifically, 
majority masculine men arrays should facilitate the category “man” (i.e., 
categorize target men’s faces faster as measured via reaction times) to a 
greater degree than majority feminine men arrays.  
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This relationship should not emerge for long prime durations (1000 ms), 
as such time is sufficient to override the use of visual cues and instead rely 
on social category information.  
 
Furthermore, regardless of men’s gender typicality and prime duration, 
majority women groups should facilitate the category “woman” (i.e., 
participants should be faster to categorize a woman’s face, compared to a 
man’s face, following majority women group primes). 
 
Findings that align with these hypotheses would provide further evidence that people construal 
processes utilize visual cue information like gender typicality. Specifically, category activation 
aligning with visual cues (i.e., masculine men) and dominant social categories (i.e., majority 
men) would suggest that gender typicality and gender ratio facilitate social category activation.  
 While the sequential priming task is sufficient to assess social category activation, it 
reveals little about the underlying process regarding social categorization. In a final study I 
assess how social categorization decisions unfold over time by using mouse-tracking software 
that provides online tracking of potential “incorrect” category attraction. By having participants 
perform a mouse-tracking categorization task (i.e., does the group contain “mostly men” or 
“mostly women”) for group stimuli that are either majority men or majority women and vary in 
men’s gender typicality, I assess the degree to which gender typicality influences social category 
decisions. I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 6: When prime duration is short (200 ms) and participants are 
categorizing majority masculine men groups, participants will show faster 
reaction times to categorize the group, more direct categorizations, and 
will make fewer errors, compared to groups composed of majority 
feminine men. This relationship, however, should be attenuated at the 
longer prime duration (1000 ms). 
 
The use of mouse-tracking affords a better understanding of participants’ underlying processes 
associated with social category activation, revealing patterns of partial activation beyond simply 
the final social categorization judgment. 
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Overall, I aim to provide a foundation for understanding visual people construal—how 
we perceive groups with varying numbers of men and women, and the downstream implications 
of this perception in terms of evaluative judgments and social category activation. Critically, by 
examining visual cues to gender (i.e., gender typicality), I explore not only social categories per 
se, but also the influence of the visual cues that underlie gender. The integration of ensemble 
perception with person construal offers numerous insights into the social vision of groups. On a 
theoretical level, understanding how group perception affects group evaluations, brings our 
laboratory studies and conceptual models closer to our real-world experience of perceiving 
people. In turn, these insights have profound implications regarding evaluative judgments such 
as threat. The novel area of people construal represents a rich and vast unexplored domain, 
pushing our understanding of the visual perception beyond a single person to that of groups. 
Study Set 1:  
Threat in the Company of Men—Ensemble Perception and Threat Evaluations of Groups 
Varying in Gender Ratio 
 The studies comprising Study Set 1 examined Hypotheses 1-3. In three studies, I (along 
with my coauthors) examined how a group’s gender ratio impacted perceivers’ ratings of threat. 
Because of associations between men and threat, aggression and violence (Archer, 2004; Eagly 
& Steffen, 1986), I hypothesized that groups would be judged as more threatening as the ratio of 
men to women increased. I tested this hypothesis using both explicit (Study 1), and more indirect 
(Study 2) measures. In Study 3, I examined two potential mediators for why groups with more 
men were judged as more threatening. On the one hand, based solely on numeric probability, 
more men within a group may directly account for judgments of threat. That is, the social 
category influence of perceiving more men within a group directly impacts threat evaluations. 
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On the other hand, more men within a group might increase the perceived coalition of the men in 
that group, which may explain higher threat evaluations. Indeed, according to the male warrior 
hypothesis, men are more attuned to intergroup conflicts, and are much more likely aggress when 
faced with intergroup conflicts (McDonald, Navarrete, & Vugt, 2012; Vugt, 2009) than women. 
Thus, to the degree that a group is more homogenous regarding the more threatening target, here 
men, the group is likely to be viewed as higher in entitativity, that is the cohesiveness of the 
group or how “groupy” the group is viewed (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 
1998). This possibility implies that perceived men’s coalition might mediate judgments of group 
threat. While not listed as a hypothesis, testing these mediators provides insight into what gives 
rise to social evaluative judgments related to groups and threat. Overall, this work is among the 
first empirical studies to bridge social vision and ensemble perception research (also see Phillips 
et al., 2014), providing novel insights into the accuracy and social evaluative consequences of 
visual group perception. 
Study 1  
Method 
Participants. Power analyses, utilizing parameters derived from our models, were run 
with MPlus simulations following guidelines by Muthén and Muthén (2002). Given the high 
power afforded by our within-subject designs, these simulations determined that at least 20 
participants were needed to detect an effect of the size estimated in our study at 90% power. 
Based on our lab’s prior rate of data collection, I collected data for two weeks to reach the 
desired number of participants. In fact, I exceeded the target number, recruiting eighty-two 
undergraduate participants (50 women, Mage = 19.19, SDage = 1.55).  
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Stimuli. Group or ensemble stimuli consisted of 3x4 arrays depicting faces of White men 
and women from the Chicago Face Database (CFD) Version 1.0 (36 men and 38 women; Ma, 
Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015). I used a custom Python script to generate arrays with faces 
randomly selected without replacement within trial, but with replacement between trials, from 
available stimuli. The location of each face was randomized within each ensemble. Ensembles 
varied in the ratio of men to women from 0:12 to 12:0 in increments of one. For each of the 13 
possible gender ratios, I generated a set of 300 unique ensembles, resulting in a total of 3,900 
ensembles from which to sample (for sample stimuli see Figure 1, please note faces depicted in 
figure are not the real faces used in stimuli, stimuli faces were drawn from the CFD). 
 
Figure 1. Sample group stimuli, depicted faces generated from thispersondoesnotexist.com, 
Chicago Face Database faces used in real stimuli 
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Procedure. Stimuli were presented and responses were recorded using Inquisit software. 
The protocol consisted of two blocks presented in counterbalanced order. Each trial began with a 
fixation cross (500 ms), followed by a randomly selected ensemble (500 ms) about which 
participants provided judgments. In one block, participants estimated the number of men in each 
ensemble (0 men – 12 men). In the other block, participants rated each ensemble along four 
evaluative dimensions: invitingness (1 = not at all inviting, 7 = extremely inviting), warmth (1 = 
extremely cold, 7 = extremely warm), hostility (1 = not at all hostile, 7 = extremely hostile), and 
threat (1 = not at all threatening, 7 = extremely threatening). Each block included 260 arrays 
randomly selected from the total population of 3,900 ensembles, with 20 ensembles for each 
level of gender ratio. After completing their judgments, participants provided demographic 
information and were debriefed.  
Results and Discussion 
I analyzed data both including and excluding participants who had incomplete data (n = 
13), and results were unchanged. I therefore included data from all participants.  
I predicted that numeric estimates would reflect the ratio of men to women in each 
ensemble, and that overall judgments of threat would increase as the ratio of men to women 
increased. I used the R packages “lme4” and “lmerTest” to compute hierarchical linear models 
which account for within-subject variation and ratings nested within participant (Bates, Mächler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015; Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015). All models included 
random intercept, random slopes with residual maximum likelihood estimation (REML). All 
coefficients were unstandardized. Also, I tested potential interactions with participant gender 
(effect coded as -1 = men, 1 = women); in all studies participant gender did not qualify any 
effect unless otherwise noted. 
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First, I examined whether participants were sensitive to the gender ratio of ensembles by 
regressing participant’s numeric estimates of men onto Gender Ratio (mean centered). Consistent 
with hypotheses, as the ratio of men to women increased, so did participants’ numeric estimates 
of men in an ensemble, B = 0.52, SE = 0.02, t(77.63) = 28.10, p < .001, 95% CIs [0.48, 0.55].2 
Next, I tested whether the actual number of men in each ensemble affected threat judgments of 
groups. To achieve this, I calculated a mean threat score by averaging the four evaluative items 
(with warmth and invitingness reverse-coded), such that higher scores represented higher threat. 
The composite of these four items showed high within-subject reliability (0.94) based on the 
method outlined by Cranford et al. (2006). Regressing the overall threat judgment score onto 
actual Gender Ratio, I found that as the ratio of men to women increased, threat judgments also 
increased, B = 0.06, SE = 0.01, t (78.65) = 6.55, p < .001, 95% CIs = [0.04, 0.07]. In summary, 
consistent with our hypotheses, participant’s numeric estimates of men in an ensemble 
corresponded to the actual number of men depicted in each ensemble. Importantly, perceivers 
also judged the group to be more threatening as the ratio of men to women increased.  
Study 2 
In Study 2, I extended these findings beyond self-report measures by using a more 
indirect measure: the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). 
The AMP has been used as an indirect measure of both emotion (e.g., fear) and semantic (e.g., 
                                               
2 There was a significant Gender Ratio by Participant Gender interaction, B = 0.06, SE = 0.02, 
t(66) = 2.85, p = .006, 95% CIs [0.02, 0.10]. We decomposed the interaction by examining 
simple effects of Gender Ratio broken down by Participant Gender. Results showed that 
women’s numeric estimates of men were more strongly tethered to gender ratio, B = 0.54, SE = 
0.02, t(49) = 23.62, p < .001, 95% CIs [0.50, 0.59], than were men’s numeric estimates, B = 
0.42, SE = 0.03, t(17) = 13.61, p < .001, 95% CIs [0.36, 0.48]. However, both simple effects 
were significant and in the same direction, indicating that participants’ numeric estimates of men 
increased as the ratio of men to women increased.  
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personality traits; animacy) concepts and a previous meta-analysis indicated it is a valid and 
reliable means of measuring attitudes on par with other similarly implicit tasks (Deutsch & 
Gawronski, 2009; Gawronski & Ye, 2014). Aligning with results from Study 1, I hypothesized 
that the arrays with higher ratios of men to women would prime the concept of threat, leading to 
a misattribution of threat for subsequently presented targets.  
Method 
Participants. As in Study 1, power analyses using MPlus simulations were conducted 
with parameters derived from our models. Based on these simulations, I determined that a 
sample size of at least 20 was needed to detect an effect of the size estimated in our study at 90% 
power. Again, based on our lab’s prior rate of data collection, I collected data for two weeks to 
reach the desired number of participants. In this time, I exceed the desired number, recruiting 
102 undergraduate participants (74 women, Mage = 18.92, SDage = 1.23).  
Stimuli. The AMP utilizes two types of stimuli: primes and targets. Prime stimuli 
consisted of ensembles from Study 1 depicting five different gender ratios of men to women: 
0:12, 3:9, 6:6, 9:3, and 12:0 (300 unique arrays per gender ratio). Target stimuli for the AMP 
traditionally consist of a set of Chinese characters (Payne et al., 2008). Many participants in our 
subject pool are familiar with Chinese, so I generated a new set of 360 target stimuli that 
depicted unique combinations of Thai letters. 
Procedure. Utilizing the AMP script developed for Inquisit software (Borchert, 2016), 
participants viewed pairs of images flashed sequentially on a computer screen. Participants’ task 
was to judge whether the second image—the target stimulus—appeared to be more threatening 
or less threatening than the average stimulus by pressing “E” or “I” on the keyboard 
(counterbalanced across participants). Each trial consisted of the following: a prime stimulus 
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(i.e., an ensemble) presented for 75 ms, a blank screen for 125 ms, a target stimulus (i.e., Thai 
letters) for 100 ms, and a visual mask that remained on the screen until the participant made a 
judgment. Participants completed ten practice trials followed by 360 critical trials (randomized), 
consisting of 60 trials for each sex ratio and 60 additional trials that contained no prime. Upon 
completion, participants provided demographic information and indicated whether or not they 
knew Thai. 
Results and Discussion 
 Eight participants were excluded for providing invariant responses (e.g., rated all stimuli 
as more threatening) and one participant was excluded for indicating they knew Thai, leaving a 
total sample of 93 participants.  
 I analyzed data using the R packages “lme4” and “lmerTest”, ensuring models fit a 
binomial distribution. I coded AMP responses dichotomously (0 = less threatening, 1 = more 
threatening) and the gender ratio of prime stimuli continuously (from 0 (0 men:12 women) to 4 
(12 men:0 women), mean centered). I then regressed AMP responses onto Gender Ratio. As 
predicted, for each unit increase in Gender Ratio, the odds ratio for categorizing the target as 
more threatening, compared to less threatening, increased by 1.07, B = 0.07, SE = .02, z = 2.89, 
p = .004, 95% CIs = [0.02, 0.12], OR = 1.07. This effect was qualified by a higher-order 
quadratic trend (see Figure 2),3 whereby the likelihood of a target stimulus being judged as more 
threatening was relatively equal when women outnumbered men (i.e., 0 men:12 women, 3 men:9 
                                               
3 For this quadratic trend, I found a significant interaction with Participant Gender, B = 0.02, SE 
= 0.01, z = 2.46, p = .014, 95% CIs = [0.01, 0.04]. I decomposed the interaction by exploring the 
simple quadratic effect separately for men and women. For women, the quadratic trend was 
significant, B = 0.03, SE = 0.009, z = 3.25, p = .001, 95% CIs [0.01, 0.05]; for men, the 
quadratic trend was not significant, B = -0.01, SE = 0.02, z = -0.81, p = .418, 95% CIs [-0.05, 
0.02]. I should note, however, that there were few men (n = 18 after exclusions) thus strong 
interpretations should be cautiously drawn. 
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women) and when men and women were equal (i.e., 6 men:6 women), but increased 
exponentially as men became the majority in the arrays, B = 0.02, SE = 0.01, z = 2.53, p = .011, 
95% CIs [0.01, 0.04], OR = 1.02. Thus, when exposed to majority men groups, participants 
judged a subsequent target to be more threatening. These results corroborate the explicit 
evaluations from Study 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted probabilities from Study 2 of categorizing the target as “more threatening” 
as a function of number of men in the prime array. 
 
Study 3 
 In Study 3 I examined two potential underlying factors accounting for why a group of 
men may be viewed as more threatening. As argued above, one straightforward explanation may 
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be that because men are associated more with violence and aggression (Archer, 2004; Eagly & 
Steffen, 1986), perceived threat might increase as the ratio of men to women increases. 
Alternately, because men, compare to women, more often enact coalitional aggression and 
violence (McDonald et al., 2012; Vugt, 2009), the degree to which the men in an array are 
perceived to be a collective entity may account for higher threat evaluations. I examined these 
ideas in Study 3, as well as replicated results from Study 1, by testing whether the perceived 
number of men or the perceived coalition of the men in the group mediated the relationship 
between the gender ratio and threat evaluations. 
Method 
Participants. I replicated the recruitment strategy for Study 1, collecting data for a total 
of two weeks. In this time, I recruited 99 undergraduate participants (68 women, Mage = 19.42, 
SDage = 1.28). 
Stimuli. I utilized the stimuli from Study 1, however I excluded ensembles with men to 
women ratios of: 0:12, 1:11, 2:10 and 10:2, 11:1, 12:0 because groups of zero, one, or two 
individuals would be unlikely to constitute a coalition, thereby rendering our measure 
meaningless for these groups. Thus, our pool of potential ensembles was 2,100, with 300 unique 
ensembles per gender ratio. 
Procedure. Overall the protocol replicated Study 1, with two notable differences. First, 
the blocks were presented in sequential order, with numeric estimations first, followed by 
evaluative judgments, and a new block assessing perceived coalition of the group. For this 
coalition judgment, participants were instructed to respond to questions I adapted from the 
entitativity literature (Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006): “To what extent do the men seem more like a 
group rather than just a bunch of individuals?” (1 = Much more like a collection of individuals 
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than a group, 7 = Much more like a group than a collection of individuals).4 To allow for tests of 
mediation, participants judged the same set of randomly selected ensembles from the total pool 
of potential ensembles from the first block in each subsequent block, presented in a random order 
within each block. After completing the task, participants provided demographic information and 
were debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
As in Study 1, I hypothesized that numeric estimates of the number of men and threat 
judgments for ensembles would increase as the gender ratio of men to women increased. I also 
hypothesized that as the gender ratio of men to women increased, judgments of men’s coalition 
would increase. Finally, I tested whether perceived number of men or perceived men’s coalition 
mediated threat judgments. 
I used the same R packages and analytic strategy as Study 1, fitting hierarchical linear 
models to the data. To test our hypotheses regarding mediation I used the “mediation” package in 
R (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2013) and examined two different mediation 
models, one with the perceived number of men as the mediator, and the other with judgments of 
men’s coalition as the mediator. For each model run, I set the simulation parameter to 1,000. No 
participants had incomplete data. 
Results for numeric estimations and threat judgments followed the same pattern found in 
Study 1. In terms of numeric estimations, as the ratio of men to women increased, so did 
participants’ numeric estimates of men in the ensemble, B = 0.33, SE = 0.02, t(89.12) = 20.21, p 
                                               
4 Immediately following the men’s coalition question, I also asked the same question but 
replaced the word men with women. Overall results with women were in the predicted direction 
(e.g., as the Gender Ratio of men to women in the ensemble increased, perceived women’s 
coalition decreased). Multilevel mediation analyses did reveal that women’s coalition mediated 
threat judgments, unlike the finding for men. 
 40 
< .001, 95% CIs [0.30, 0.37]. Unlike Study 1, the Participant Gender by Gender Ratio interaction 
did not reach significance, B = 0.004, SE = 0.04, t(88.55) = 0.11, p = .911. Threat judgments 
(which had high within-subject reliability, 0.97) also showed the same pattern as Study 1, as the 
ratio of men to women increased, so did threat judgments, B = 0.04, SE = 0.01, t(83.51) = 6.04, 
p < .001, 95% CIs = [0.02, 0.05]. Consistent with hypotheses, I found that as the ratio of men to 
women increased, participants judged the men in the group to represent a coalition, rather than a 
collection of individuals, B = 0.09, SE = 0.01, t(87.46) = 7.09, p < .001, 95% CIs = [0.07, 0.12]. 
Lastly, I tested whether Perceived Number of Men and judgments of Men’s Coalition predicted 
overall threat judgments. As numeric estimates of men in the ensemble increased so did threat 
judgments, B = 0.03, SE = 0.004, t(66.55) = 5.66, p < .001, 95% CIs = [0.02, 0.04]; however 
Men’s Coalition did not predict higher threat judgments, B = 0.01, SE = 0.01, t(79.36) = 1.24, p 
= .218, 95% CIs = [-0.001, 0.003]. 
Finally, I examined two different mediation models to determine whether the relationship 
between Gender Ratio and overall threat judgments was mediated by the Perceived Number of 
Men or judgments of Men’s Coalition. I conducted mediation tests using multilevel mediation 
analyses (see Zhang, et al., 2016 for review), examining the average causal mediation effect 
(ACME) and the average direct effect (ADE). First, I tested whether Perceived Number of Men 
was a mediator of the relationship between Gender Ratio and threat judgments. Results indicated 
that the ACME was significant, ACME = 0.01, p < .001, 95% CIs = [0.002, 0.01]. I also found 
evidence for a significant ADE = 0.03, p < .001, 95% CIs = [0.02, 0.04]. Overall, the significant 
ACME, indicates that Perceived Number of Men mediated the relationship between Gender 
Ratio (i.e., the actual number of men) and threat judgments.  
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Next, I tested Men’s Coalition judgments mediated the relationship between Gender 
Ratio and threat judgments. In this model, the ACME did not reach significance, ACME = 
0.0003, p = .610, 95% CIs = [-0.0001, 0.001]; there was however a significant ADE = 0.04, p 
< .001, 95% CIs = [0.02, 0.05]. Thus, I did not find evidence that Men’s Coalition judgments 
mediated the relationship between Gender Ratio and threat judgments. 
General Discussion  
Results from Study Set 1 confirmed hypotheses, indicating that perceivers were sensitive 
to the gender ratio of twelve person groups, even after a very brief visual presentation (500 ms). 
Furthermore, trait ratings of groups, assessed both explicitly and more implicitly, tracked the 
groups’ gender ratio—as the number of men increased (and the number of women decreased), 
the group was rated as more threatening and hostile, and less warm and inviting. Interestingly, 
participants’ numeric estimates of the number of men and not perceived men’s coalition, 
mediated group threat ratings, suggesting that perceived social categories serve as the critical cue 
for evaluative inferences about briefly presented groups. 
 Study Set 1 offers a first glimpse into how we perceive and evaluate groups of people. 
Results confirmed long standing tenants of person construal, specifically the capacity to make 
social category judgments and their importance for how we evaluate others (Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). It is particularly telling that facilitated priming effects emerged even after a 
group was presented for as little as 75 ms, with majority men groups associated with more threat. 
This finding is particularly interesting in the context of ensemble perception. Given that our 
perception of groups results in extracting the average or mean gender typicality of the group, a 
group of six men and six women may result in an average that is ambiguously gendered (neither 
a man nor a woman). Thus, it is only when the men become the majority, resulting in a distinctly 
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masculine or “man” ensemble summation, that priming effects emerge. This may be especially 
the case when viewing arrays for such a short duration (75 ms), which mimics speeds in vision 
research (Haberman & Whitney, 2007). 
This research is some of the first to explicitly focus on the visual perception of groups, 
merging ensemble perception from vision science to address social psychological questions such 
as group evaluations. Indeed, aligning with shifts to focus on our perception of actual persons 
(e.g., the face of a man or woman), as opposed to category labels (i.e., the word man or woman, 
Zebrowitz, 2006); this work situates our perception of actual groups rather than group descriptors 
(e.g., faces of men and women as opposed to a bar graph showing the percentage of men and 
women). Thus, this work extends knowledge about our sensitivity and capacity to perceive these 
more complex group stimuli and highlights the critical role that social category knowledge plays 
in our trait evaluations of groups. 
Study 4: Impact of Men’s Gender Typicality Cues on Group Perception and Group 
Evaluation 
 Results from Study Set 1 revealed insights into people construal drawn from category-
based group perception (i.e., men and women). It remains unknown, however, whether 
perceivers are sensitive to phenotypic visual cues to gender (i.e., masculinity and femininity) in 
the context of groups. That is, how might categorical perception and the inferences drawn about 
groups change as a function of the visual cues which support such categorical judgments? By 
investigating the role of gender typicality via visual gender cues, I begin to situate people 
construal within person construal frameworks—specifically, the utilization and impact of 
bottom-up visual cues to gender typicality on both categorical judgments (i.e., the number of 
men within a group) as well as group trait evaluations. 
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I again turn to ensemble perception to understand whether phenotypic variation, such as 
gender typicality, affects people construal. Ensemble perception of facial identity provides 
indirect evidence that perceivers are sensitive to gender typicality when forming summary 
representations of groups. For instance, when presented with groups composed of faces morphed 
across three distinct identities, which varied in gender typicality, perceivers could accurately 
represent the mean identity of the group (Bai, Leib, Puri, Whitney, & Peng, 2015). While 
identity and gender typicality are undoubtedly unique, this evidence suggests that perceivers are 
sensitive to fine-grained visual cues (e.g., denoting facial identity) and not just broader social 
categories (e.g., gender). In addition, Phillips and colleagues (2018), demonstrated that 
perceivers were above chance in determining whether a four-person group had more or less 
gender typicality variability than a previously presented four-person group, and this effect was 
robust to backward masking and reduced presentation times (200 ms). One limitation to prior 
work is the few unique facial identities used (three and seven respectively). Additionally, the 
scope of the questions focused on perceptual capability (i.e., summary representation and the 
ability to distinguished variability) rather than potential downstream consequences associated 
with visual gender typicality cues. Still, these findings suggest that a target’s gender typicality 
within groups should be perceptual apparent and in turn, should influence social evaluative 
impressions of the group as a whole.  
Broadly, Study 4 investigated within-category, bottom-up, visual cues to gender 
typicality and their impact on people construal phenomenon—category-based numeric 
estimations and social evaluative group judgments. To investigate these questions, I generated a 
new set of face stimuli in which each man’s face was morphed to composite men’s or women’s 
faces, resulting in distinctly masculine or feminine gender typicality. These morphed faces 
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comprised the pool of available stimuli for group array generation. The use of morphed faces 
was advantageous as it allowed for the same man’s face to be used as the base for a masculinized 
or feminized version, thus facial characteristics indicative of identity were preserved and a direct 
effect of gender typicality was assessed. As in Study Set 1, I focused on men’s faces, as 
questions related to threat judgments were more relevant for differences related to masculine and 
feminine men’s faces. I note, however, that future extensions will investigate the influence of 
gender typicality on women’s faces.  
Study 4 largely follows methods from Studies 1 and 3, with perceivers making category-
based (i.e., the number of men) and trait judgments (i.e., threat/hostility; warmth/invitingness) 
about visually perceived groups. In addition, I included a new measure assessing the perceived 
average gender typicality of the group. This new measure provided an assessment of gender 
typicality that does not rely on category labels (i.e., the number of men). Overall, I predicted that 
perceivers’ judgments would be influenced by the gender typicality of men within the arrays. 
That is, as the number of men in the group increases, masculine men groups should be judged to 
have a higher number of men in them, higher average masculinity, and higher stereotype-
consistent threat trait judgments, compared to groups composed of feminine men. 
Method 
Participants 
I recruited participants for two weeks through the UCLA Communication Department 
SONA pool. During this time 96 participants were recruited (22 men, 74 women, Mage = 19.17, 
SDage = 0.99, 30.2% Asian/Asian American, 21.9% White/European American). 
Stimuli 
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As in previous studies, the final stimuli were 3x4 arrays composed of men’s and 
women’s faces. I used a custom python script to generate ensembles, in real-time, with random 
placement and random selection of faces within a 3x4 grid. Faces were pulled from the pool of 
available faces (see below), with the limitation that no face appeared twice with the same array. 
 Different from Studies 1-3, the pool of available men’s faces was composed of masculine 
morphed and feminine morphed men’s faces. These faces were generated using FantaMorph 
which allows for the two-dimensional averaging of facial images based on 114 landmarks placed 
upon faces. To generate these facial morphs, I first created 10 composite morphs of men’s faces 
by randomly selecting White men’s faces from the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015) and 
morphing them together. A similar process was used to create 10 composites of women’s faces. 
In total, I created 10 men’s faces and 10 women’s faces which served as the anchors for 
subsequent morphs. I then morphed 66 White men’s faces from the Chicago Face Database 
(excluding faces which were categorized below 80% White based on pre-test data (see Ma et al., 
2015), faces with hair below the shoulders, and faces which produced artifacts in the morphing) 
35% towards one of the ten composite men’s and women’s faces (randomly selected). In total I 
generated a masculine and feminine version of all 66 faces (in total 132 faces). Since morphing 
can produce subtle yet impactful facial changes (e.g., smoother skin, see Sutherland, Rhodes, &  
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Young, 2017) I also morphed each woman’s face, selected from the Chicago Face Database (n = 
72), to a randomly selected women’s base face. Thus, I created morphs for each woman’s face 
which still preserved gender typicality. In sum, the pool of faces from which ensembles were 
created contained 66 White masculine men’s faces, 66 White feminine men’s faces, and 72 
White women’s faces (see Figure 3 for sample stimuli). 
Figure 3. Sample stimuli, feminine men’s faces on the left, masculine men’s faces on the right 
 
Procedure 
The procedure closely mirrored Study 1. Participants made three different sets of 
judgments across three randomly presented blocks. In one block, participants estimated the 
number of men within the arrays (0 men – 12 men). In another block, participants rated each 
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ensemble in terms of four evaluative dimensions: invitingness (1 = not at all inviting, 7 = 
extremely inviting), warmth (1 = extremely cold, 7 = extremely warm), hostility (1 = not at all 
hostile, 7 = extremely hostile), and threat (1 = not at all threatening, 7 = extremely threatening). 
These dimensions were presented in random order following each array. New to Study 4, 
participants also made judgments assessing the overall gender typicality of the array (i.e., “please 
select the face which best represents the mean or average facial masculinity/femininity from the 
group”), using a visual scale composed of FaceGen faces. This scale depicted faces morphed 
along a gender continuum and participants were asked to indicate via numbers below each face, 
which face best represented the average face from the array in terms of masculinity/femininity 
(see Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Gender Typicality Scale 
 
The stimuli presentation program randomly selected from the pool of available faces 
when forming each array with the constraint that no face would appear twice in one array. In 
total 200 arrays were created per participant, with 40 arrays for each gender ratio level (0 men: 
12 women; 3 men:9 women, 6 men:6 women; 9 men:3 women; and 12 men:0 women), 20 
composed of masculine men’s faces, and 20 composed of feminine men’s faces. Each face in the 
array was randomly placed into a 3x4 grid. For each trial, participants saw the array for 500 ms 
and then were presented with the question. For each participant, they rated the same set of 200 
arrays, that is, the array creation process occurred once at the start of the experiment and 
participants then saw the same 200 arrays across the three blocks, presented in a random order. 
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After completing the three blocks of judgments, participants provided demographic information 
and were debriefed. 
Results 
 I first present numeric estimations, followed by gender typicality and lastly threat 
judgments. For all analyses, I used hierarchical linear models. I included as fixed effects the 
actual Number of Men in the array (mean-centered) and Gender Typicality, that is whether the 
men’s faces were masculine or feminine (effect coded, -1 = feminine, 1 = masculine), as well as 
the interaction between Number of Men and Gender Typicality. Since stimuli were randomly 
generated only participant was included as a random factor. Models included random intercepts 
and random slopes however random slopes were removed if convergence issues emerged, if 
models resulted in singular fit, or if reduced models did not result in lower model fit as assessed 
by deviance values from maximum likelihood estimation ANOVA tests being significant. Exact 
model specification is reported within results. Analyses were conducted in R using lmer and 
lmerTests (Bates et al., 2015; Kuznetsova et al., 2015). For all analyses, results indicated no 
significant interaction with Participant Gender and thus this factor was removed. 
Numeric Estimations 
A model with random slopes for Gender Typicality and Number of Men was fit to the 
data. Results revealed that as the Number of Men in the array increased, so did participants’ 
numeric estimates of men in the ensemble, B = 2.56, SE = 0.08, t(97.69) = 33.14, p < .001, 95% 
CIs [2.41, 2.71] (see Figure 5). There was also a significant effect for Gender Typicality with 
arrays that contained feminine faces resulting in lower estimates of men in the ensemble, B = -
0.36, SE = 0.03, t(99.79) = -13.79, p < .001, 95% CIs [-0.42, -0.31]. Critically, there was a 
significant interaction between the Gender Typicality and Number of Men, B = -0.31, SE = 0.02, 
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t(13957.11) = -13.38, p < .001, 95% CIs [-0.40, -0.27]. Simple slopes indicated that for 
masculine men’s faces, there was a steeper slope for Number of Men, B = 2.87, SE = 0.08, 
t(135.13) = 34.30, p < .001, 95% CIs [2.71, 3.04], compared to feminine men’s faces, B = 2.25, 
SE = 0.08, t(99.33) = 28.95, p < .001, 95% CIs [2.09, 2.40].  
Figure 5. Estimated Number of Men by Actual Number of Men and whether arrays contained 
Feminine or Masculine men. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Average Gender Typicality 
Similar results were obtained for average gender typicality, again with a model which 
included random slopes for Number of Men and Gender Typicality. As the Number of Men in 
the array increased, so did participants’ ratings of average gender, B = 2.91, SE = 0.14, t(96.73) 
= 21.17 p < .001, 95% CIs [2.64, 3.18] (see Figure 6). There was also an effect of Gender 
Typicality, such that arrays which contained feminine faces resulted in lower scores on average 
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gender, B = -0.43, SE = 0.04, t(98.18) = -9.78, p < .001, 95% CIs [-0.51, -0.34]. These results 
were qualified by a significant interaction between the Number of Men and Gender Typicality, B 
= -0.36, SE = 0.04, t(13860.61) = -9.96, p < .001, 95% CIs [-0.43, -0.29]. Simple slopes 
indicated that when the men’s faces were masculine, there was a steeper slope for Number of 
Men, B = 3.27, SE = 0.15, t(123.76) = 22.36, p < .001, 95% CIs [2.98, 3.56] compared to when 
the men’s faces were feminine, B = 2.55, SE = 0.14, t(97.94) = 18.50, p < .001, 95% CIs [2.28, 
2.82]. 
 
Figure 6. Average Gender Typicality Rating by Actual Number of Men and whether arrays 
contained Feminine or Masculine men. Depicted faces represent faces from gender typicality 
scale for value shown from 12 men:0 women groups. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Threat Ratings 
A mean score was formed from the four evaluative items with warmth and invitingness 
reverse coded. A model which included random slopes for Number of Men and Gender 
Typicality revealed that as the Number of Men in the array increased, participants judged the 
array as more threatening, B =  0.19, SE = 0.02, t(96.42) = 9.65, p < .001, 95% CIs [0.15, 0.23] 
(see Figure 7). There was also an effect of Gender Typicality, such that arrays which contained 
feminine faces resulted in the array being viewed as less threatening, B = -0.04, SE = 0.01, 
t(97.99) = -6.39, p < .001, 95% CIs [-0.06, -0.03]. These results were qualified by a significant 
interaction between the Number of Men and Gender Typicality, B = -0.02, SE = 0.01, 
t(13769.93) = -3.64, p < .001, 95% CIs [-0.03, -0.01]. Simple slopes indicated that when the 
men’s faces were masculine, there was a steeper slope for Number of Men, B = 0.21, SE = 0.02, 
t(130.69) = 9.93, p < .001, 95% CIs [0.17, 0.25] compared to when the men’s faces were 
feminine, B = 0.17, SE = 0.02, t(97.93) = 8.55, p < .001, 95% CIs [0.13, 0.21]. 
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Figure 7. Average Threat Rating by Actual Number of Men and whether arrays contained 
Feminine or Masculine men. Bands represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
Study 4 revealed that perceivers were sensitive to bottom-up visual cues to gender and 
critically that these cues impacted perceptual and trait judgments about groups. Specifically, 
results indicated that as the number of men in the array increased, steeper slopes were found for 
arrays composed of masculine men compared to feminine men across a number of measures—
participants’ estimated number of men, average gender typicality, and threat ratings. Together 
with Study Set 1, this work supports the assertion that a people construal framework must 
incorporate both the perception of social categories (e.g., this is a group mostly of men) and 
visual cues to within-category difference (e.g., this is a group of mostly masculine men). 
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Results from Study 4 aligned with tenants from models of person perception, namely the 
influence of bottom-up visual cues, here demonstrated with facial morphing changes in gender 
typicality (Freeman & Ambady, 2011). Again, I found that following surprisingly brief visual 
presentations (500 ms) perceivers were sensitive to a group’s gender ratio and visual cues to 
gender typicality. As social vision researchers have argued, these phenotypic visual cues are vital 
to how we perceive the person (Johnson & Adams, 2013), and here I show they are also vital to 
how we perceive a group, affecting social category-based judgments as well as group 
evaluations. These results also inform ensemble perception findings as they highlight perceivers 
flexibility in integrating visual information across a much larger range of identities (66 unique 
faces) as previously examined (4 and 7 unique faces, Bai et al., 2015; Phillips et al., 2018). 
While our measures were not as precise with regards to the exact assessment of the average 
percept (Bai et al., 2015), the addition of a gender typicality measure results in a close correlate 
to ensemble averaging. The other advantage of the gender typicality measure was that it reduced 
the potential influence of using a label when asking for numeric estimations (e.g., “men” as 
opposed to “women”). The fact that findings were similar across both a visual scale and numeric 
estimations suggests perceivers do note differences without having to use an explicit category 
label (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). In sum, Study 4 extends people construal by focusing on 
the capacity and impact of perceiving bottom-up visual cues to gender typicality when making 
perceptual and social evaluations from groups. 
Study Set 2: Visual People Construal and Social Category Activation 
Studies 1-4 investigated perceptually derived numeric estimates and trait judgments of 
groups, however, did not address processes associated with social category activation. A tenant 
of person construal research is that social category information is extracted from targets with 
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relative ease, subsequently activating category-based knowledge which reduces the complexity 
of our social world (Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). This notion, applied to visually perceived 
groups, has immense implications for downstream consequences such as stereotyping and 
prejudice (Lick & Johnson, 2016). For instance, Cooley and Payne (2017), using the AMP, 
demonstrated that groups of three Black men were implicitly associated with more negative 
judgments compared to a single Black man. Still, prior research has yet to investigate whether 
visually perceived groups varying in gender ratio facilitate social category activation, the topic 
addressed in Studies 5 and 6. 
 Within this context, I also build upon Study 4, examining the role of bottom-up visual 
cues to social categories (i.e., gender typicality). As shown in Study 4, differences in visual cue 
utilization emerged even after a short visual presentation (500 ms); reflecting the importance of 
differentiating visual cues and social categories. To this end, I used social cognition methods 
employed by Macrae and Martin (2007) who found that by varying prime duration, different 
patterns of category activation emerged. In their study, participants, after seeing a prime stimulus 
for a very brief presentation (20 ms) showed mismatched category activation due to features (i.e., 
hairstyle) rather than the prime’s gender category (i.e., man or woman). These findings 
showcased the potency of gendered feature cues, such as hairstyle, in leading to erroneous social 
category activation. Additionally, recent studies using mouse-tracking software, demonstrated 
that social categorization decisions about gender atypical men and women resulted in partial 
opposite-category activation (e.g., a feminine man’s face resulted in attraction to the category 
label “woman” to a greater extent compared to a masculine man’s face, Freeman et al., 2008). 
Thus, while overall categorization accuracy was high, visual cues to gender swayed the decision 
process. In summary, in Study Set 2, I investigate people construal in terms of social category 
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activation, answering the question—do groups activate social category knowledge in a manner 
similar to past person construal research.  
Study 5 
 In Study 5 I borrowed methods from Macrae and Martin’s (2007) work examining the 
effects of social categories versus visual cues on category activation. In their study, they found 
that by varying presentation duration, short (20 ms) versus long (200 ms), participants showed 
different social category activation patterns reflecting either social category use or visual cue use. 
Specifically, their results showed that presenting a prime for a short duration led to priming via 
visual cues (e.g., women with short hair led to faster categorization of men’s names) compared to 
long primes which led to priming via social category (e.g., women, regardless of hair length, led 
to faster categorization of women’s names). By manipulating prime duration (short versus long), 
men’s gender typicality (masculine versus feminine), prime (majority men versus majority 
women groups) and assessing gender categorization of a subsequent target (man or woman’s 
face), I tested a similar process with groups. Specifically, I hypothesized that majority masculine 
men groups, compared to majority feminine men groups, will facilitate categorization of a target 
man’s face, when these groups are presented at a short prime duration, that is, when visual cues 
should be most impactful (Macrae & Martin, 2007). Furthermore, I anticipate that majority 
women groups, regardless of men’s gender typicality and prime duration, will facilitate 
categorization of a target woman’s face (i.e., a traditional priming effect). In sum, I explored the 
independent and interactive effects of a groups’ gender ratio and visual cues to gender typicality, 
demonstrating how both operate to activate social categories. 
Method 
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Participants. Following standard lab procedures, I recruited UCLA undergraduates using 
the Communications SONA subject pool. Data collection began at the start of the Spring 2019 
quarter and continued until halfway through the quarter.5 In this time, I collected data from 55 
participants. Due to computer errors, 14 participants were excluded as incomplete data was 
recorded, leaving a sample size of 41 participants (33 women, 8 men, Mage = 19.10, SDage = 1.07, 
20 White/European American, 13 Asian/Asian American, 3 Black/African American, 5 did not 
respond to the race/ethnicity question).  
Stimuli. For this study, there were two types of stimuli: primes and targets. The primes 
consisted of 3x4 arrays with a gender ratio of 9 men:3 women (Majority Men) and 3 men:9 
women (Majority Women). Within each of these arrays, I used faces from Study 4, which varied 
in men’s gender typicality (Masculine men or Feminine men). Thus, there were four types of 
primes: majority men/masculine men, majority men/feminine men, majority women/masculine 
men, and majority women/feminine men. These primes were generated in a manner similar to 
Studies 1-3 and the groups were created from the pools of available faces from Study 4. In total, 
there were 80 primes per type, totaling 320 primes.  
For the targets, I used a set of men’s and women’s faces from the Center for Vital 
Longevity Face Database (Minear & Park, 2004). Target faces were only of White men and 
women and were a standard image size with neutral facial expressions.  
 Procedure. Overall, the study was a 2 (Prime: majority men, majority women) by 2 
(Target: match, mismatch) by 2 (Gender Typicality: masculine men, feminine men) by 2 (Prime 
Duration: 200 ms, 1000 ms) repeated measures design. Each trial in this task proceed as follows: 
                                               
5 Due to dissertation deadlines data analysis occurred before complete data collection was finished. Data collection, 
however, continued in order to reach participant numbers comparable to other studies presented in this dissertation.  
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participants saw a fixation cross (500 ms), followed by a prime array (majority men/masculine 
men, majority men/feminine men, majority women/masculine men, majority women/feminine 
men) for a set duration (200 ms or 1000 ms). After viewing the prime array, participants saw a 
target face (man or woman) and were asked to categorize the target face as either a man or a 
woman by pressing the “e” or “i” key, counterbalanced across participants. The target face 
remained on the screen until a response was made. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms. There 
were two counter-balanced blocks in which primes were presented for either the short (200 ms) 
or long (1,000 ms) duration. All prime-target pairings were random with an even split across the 
two blocks, such that there were 40 trials per prime array type, resulting in 160 trials per block 
and 320 trials total. 
Results and Discussion 
The dependent measure was reaction time to categorize the target (i.e. the subsequently 
presented face) as either a man or a woman. Following Macrae and Martin (2007), trials were 
excluded if an incorrect categorization was made (3.1%, n = 824 out of 26240 trials). 
Additionally, reaction times below 50 ms (n = 5) and three standard deviations above the mean 
reaction time (RTmean = 704.035, RTsd = 505.914, n = 355) were excluded. This left a total of 
24,640 trials. 
A crossed hierarchical linear model including all predictors (effect-coded) and all higher 
order interactions was fit to the data. Predictors included Prime (majority men, majority women), 
Target (match, mismatch, e.g., a match for majority men primes would be a man’s face), Gender 
Typicality (masculine men, feminine men) and Prime Duration (200 ms, 1000 ms). The model 
included random intercepts for both participants and for target. Results indicated a significant 
main effect of Duration, B = -28.02, SE = 1.69, t(24514.52) = -16.61, p < .001, 95% CIs [-31.33, 
 58 
-24.72] and a significant Target by Match interaction, B = -7.51, SE = 2.27, t(77.71) = -3.31, p 
= .001, 95% CIs [-11.98, -3.03]. Critically these results were qualified by the predicted four-way 
interaction across Prime, Target, Gender Typicality, and Prime Duration, B = 3.79, SE = 1.68, 
t(24511.20) = 2.25, p = .024, 95% CIs [0.50, 7.09]. 
 Decomposing this four-way interaction, I first examined the three-way interaction, Target 
by Gender Typicality by Prime Duration, separately for Prime—Majority Men and Majority 
Women. Since my hypothesis centered on the effect of visual cues (i.e., Gender Typicality) on 
category activation, it is reasonable that Majority Men trials (9 men in the group) would be more 
likely to show the effect of (Men’s) Gender Typicality compared to Majority Women trials (only 
3 men in the group).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Reaction times by Trial Type (Majority Men, top, Majority Women, bottom), Prime 
Duration (Short, Long), Target (Matched Prime, Mismatched Prime), and Men’s Gender 
Typicality (Masculine, Feminine). *p < .05. 
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Results for Majority Men primes revealed a significant effect of Duration, B = -30.21, SE 
= 2.37, t(12227.43) = -12.77, p < .001, 95% CIs [-34.85, -25.57] and a significant effect of 
Target, B = -5.98, SE = 2.78, t(77.93) = -2.15, p = .035, 95% CIs [-11.46, -0.50] however these 
were qualified by a significant three-way interaction across Target, Gender Typicality, and 
Duration, B = 6.06, SE = 2.36, t(12223.76) = 2.57, p = .010, 95% CIs [1.44, 10.69] (see top of 
Figure 8). Further decomposing of this three-way interaction by Duration, showed that for the 
1,000 ms duration there were no significant effects, ps > .118, suggesting no differences in 
reaction times for gender categorizations targets depending on prime at this duration.  
However, for the 200 ms duration, wherein based on Macrae & Martin (2007) visual cues 
should have greater impact, results revealed a significant two-way interaction between Target 
and Gender Typicality, B = 6.88, SE = 3.12, t(5966.64) = 2.21, p = .027, 95% CIs [0.77, 13.00] 
such that for matching trials, participants were faster to categorize the target as a man when the 
prime was a majority masculine men group compared to a majority feminine men group, B = -
18.72, SE = 8.78, Z = 2.13, p = .033, 95% CIs [-35.93, -1.50] and for mismatch trials no 
significant effect of Gender Typicality emerged, B = 8.81, SE = 8.86, Z = 0.99, p = .320, 95% 
CIs [-8.56, 26.18]. 
Results for Majority Women primes revealed a significant effect of Duration, B = -25.84, 
SE = 2.41, t(12180.60) = -10.74, p < .001, 95% CIs [-30.55, -21.12] such that participants were 
faster to categorize targets after seeing a 200 ms prime compared to a 1000 ms prime, and a 
significant effect of Target, B = 9.02, SE = 2.88, t(77.73) = 3.13, p = .002, 95% CIs [3.34,   
14.69]. Contrary to expectations, this effect indicates participants were faster to categorize non-
matching trials (i.e., men’s faces) compared to matching trials (i.e., women’s faces) following 
majority women primes. No other effects were significant, ps > .050 (see bottom of Figure 8). 
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To summarize, results indicated that participants showed facilitated category activation 
for men’s faces following majority masculine men group primes compared to majority feminine 
men group primes, specifically when the primes were presented for a short duration (200 ms), 
that is, when visual cues should be most impactful (Macrae & Martin, 2007). While our pattern 
of results did not show a reversal in category activation due to visual cues, such as found by 
Macrae and Martin (2007), our results do align with the broader idea that participants are 
sensitive to and utilize visual cue information when it comes to social category activation 
following group primes.  
Interestingly, the other significant effect of note was faster categorization of men’s faces 
(i.e., mismatch trials) following majority women primes, regardless of men’s gender typicality 
and prime duration. This effect is at odds with predictions, however, speculatively, it could be 
due to participants consistently seeing changes in men’s facial cues while women’s facial cues 
remained static (e.g., all feminine). This constant perceptual change in men’s faces may lead 
participants to focus greater attention on men, and thus be primed to make faster men 
categorizations of targets, regardless of which category is dominant in the array. This notion, 
however, is rather speculative.  
Study 6 
Study 5 revealed evidence that visual gender typicality cues within groups facilitated 
social category activation. Specifically, that men’s faces were categorized faster following 
majority masculine men groups, compared to majority feminine men groups, at a short prime 
duration. Although informative, these results do not take into account how group categorization 
decisions unfold over time and the potential category competition that could arise from visual 
gender typicality cues versus social category based people construal. To assess the underlying 
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decisional processes that occur when social category decisions are made about visually perceived 
groups, I conducted a mouse-tracking study (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). This unique 
methodology allows for an examination into the underlying cognitive decision-making process 
associated with people construal and social category activation of groups. 
Method 
Participants. I recruited participants through the UCLA Communication Department 
SONA. In total, 89 participants were recruited (68 women, 20 men, 1 did not answer the gender 
demographic question, Mage = 19.07, SDage = 0.97, 36.0% Asian/Asian American, 36.0% 
White/European American, 13.5% Latinx American, 9.0% Multiracial, 4.4% Black/African 
American). 
Stimuli. Stimuli were twelve person groups that varied in gender ratio—majority men (9 
men:3 women) and majority women (3 men:9 women). These groups also varied in men’s 
gender typicality (masculine or feminine), with faces drawn from the pool generated in Study 4. 
Overall, 480 stimuli were created, 120 per type of stimulus (i.e., majority men/masculine men; 
majority men/feminine men; majority women/masculine men and majority women/feminine 
men). 
Procedure. To record participants’ mouse movements, I used the software package 
MouseTracker (Freeman & Ambady, 2010). This software tracks, in real-time, the computer 
mouse as participants move the mouse to select one of two options. Participants were instructed 
that they would see a group of people appear on screen, and that their task was to indicate, as 
quickly and as accurately as possible, whether the group was composed of “mostly men” or 
“mostly women”. To make this judgment, they selected one of two labels presented with these 
options in the upper left and upper right of the screen (counter-balanced across participants). To 
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ensure that participants moved the mouse while making their decisions, as opposed to making 
the decision then initiating mouse movement, a message appeared telling participants to initiate 
movement faster if participants’ mouse movements did not begin within 400 ms post-stimuli 
presentation (see Hehman, Stolier, & Freeman, 2015). 
Each trial began with a “Start” button presented at the bottom center of the screen. 
Participants clicked that button to begin the trial which also served to center the computer mouse 
at a standard x- and y-coordinate (0, 0). Target groups were randomly selected from the four 
possible target types and participants categorized the target using the “mostly men” or “mostly 
women” labels (counter-balanced at the participant level on the left or right). Target groups were 
displayed for either a short (200 ms) or long (1000 ms) duration. This manipulation mirrored 
Study 5 to compare the influence of visual phenotypic (i.e., gender typicality) versus social 
category (i.e., gender) information at different stimulus presentation times. All participants 
completed six practice trials before the experiment began to familiarize themselves with the 
procedure. In total, participants completed 160 trials, presented in a random order (40 per trial 
type), with a self-timed break halfway through the trials.  
Results 
Data Preparation and Trial Exclusions. MouseTracker software allows for multiple 
measurements to be collected, including participants’ judgment errors, categorization reaction 
time, and spatial attraction to the alternative category selection. For reaction times and spatial 
attraction, I only used trials for which correct categorizations were made, this resulted in 
excluding 2854 trials, however 11,386 trials remained (or approximately 80% of the data). 
Additional to the exclusions described above, I also excluded reaction time and spatial attraction 
trials that were three standard deviations (SD) above or below their respective means.  
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For all analyses, I used hierarchical linear models to account for the nested structure of 
judgments within participants. Participant was the random factor while Target (Majority Men, 
Majority Women), Gender Typicality (masculine, feminine) and Duration (200 ms, 1,000 ms) 
were included as fixed factors (all effect coded, -1 and 1) as well as all possible interactions. All 
models included random intercept and random slopes unless model convergence issues or 
overfitting emerged in which case random slopes were removed until models converged and/or 
appropriate fit was reached. All analyses indicate which model was ultimately fit to the data.  
Judgments. A hierarchical linear model with random intercept and random slope for 
Target was fit to a binomial distribution (correct judgments = 0, incorrect judgments = 1). 
Results revealed that participants were less likely to make a categorization error after the 1,000 
ms compared to 200 ms presentation time, B = -0.40, SE = 0.02, Z = -17.68, p < .001. 
Additionally, a significant effect for Target revealed that participants were more likely to error 
for Majority Men compared to Majority Women trials, B = 0.19, SE = 0.04, Z = 4.96, p < .001 
and a significant effect for Gender Typicality indicated that participants were more likely to error 
for feminine compared to masculine trials, B = 0.11, SE= 0.02, Z = 4.76, p < .001. Results 
revealed two significant two-way interactions. The first significant two-way interaction was 
between Duration and Target, B = 0.07, SE = 0.02, Z = 2.92, p = .004, the second two-way 
interaction was between Target and Gender Typicality, B = 0.20, SE = 0.02, Z = 8.73, p < .001. 
These two-way interactions were qualified by a significant three-way interaction across 
Duration, Target, and Gender Typicality, B = 0.05, SE = 0.02, Z = 2.03, p = .043 (see Figure 9). 
Decomposing this significant three-way interaction, results indicated that for both 1,000 ms and 
200 ms there were significant Target by Gender Typicality interactions, although this effect was 
larger for the 1,000 ms duration, B = 0.25, SE = 0.04, Z = -6.88, p < .001 compared to the 200 
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ms duration, B = 0.15, SE = 0.03, Z = 5.39, p < .001. Further breaking down these two-way 
interactions, revealed that for Majority Men groups at the 1,000 ms duration, there was a 
significant effect of Gender Typicality, B = 0.79, SE = 0.09, Z = 8.48, p < .001, with more errors 
when categorizing majority feminine men groups compared to majority masculine men groups. 
There was no significant effect of Gender Typicality for Majority Women groups at 1,000 ms, B 
= -0.20, SE = 0.11, Z = -1.80, p = .071.  
At 200 ms, for Majority Men groups, there was also a significant effect of Gender 
Typicality, B = 0.43, SE = 0.08, Z = 5.70, p < .001, demonstrating a similar pattern as above, 
with more errors when categorizing majority feminine men groups compared to majority 
masculine men groups. There was also a significant effect of Gender Typicality for Majority 
Women groups at 200 ms, B = -0.16, SE = 0.08, Z = -2.03, p = .042, reflecting a pattern 
whereby participants made more errors when categorizing majority women groups if that group 
contained three masculine men compared to three feminine men. In summary, participants’ 
pattern of errors when making majority men or majority women categorizations reflected the 
impedance of gender typicality cues. Specifically, majority feminine men groups produced 
significantly more errors than majority masculine men groups (i.e., when gender typicality cues 
misaligned), with this difference greater for the 1,000 ms compared to 200 ms viewing duration. 
Additionally, for majority women groups, participants errored more when the men in the group 
were masculine (misaligning with the category ‘mostly women’) compared to feminine. 
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Figure 9. Predicted Probability of Error by Prime Duration (Long, Short), Target (Majority Men, 
Majority Women) and Men’s Gender Typicality (Masculine, Feminine) 
 
Reaction Time. I hypothesized that reaction times for categorizing groups would be 
faster when visual gender typicality cues matched social category information (e.g., masculine 
men arrays compared to feminine men arrays). In addition, I anticipated that this effect would be 
stronger for majority men arrays, as there would be a greater number of men in such arrays 
compared to majority women arrays. I also examined whether prime duration would affect 
results, aligning with Study 5 results. 
There were 151 trials that exceeded three SD above the mean for reaction time (Mreaction 
time = 1048.62, SDreaction time = 461.96) and thus these trials were excluded. Results from a full 
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model (random intercept and random slope for Target and Duration) revealed no significant 
three-way interaction for Target, Gender Typicality, and Duration, B = -2.29, SE = 2.58, 
t(10988.34) = -0.89, p = .375, 95% CIs [-7.35, 2.77], as well as no significant interaction 
between Duration and Target (p = .155) and Duration and Gender Typicality (p = .722). Thus, 
for model parsimony, I reported the model results without the interaction terms for Duration. 
Results from this reduced model (random intercepts and random slopes for Target and 
Duration), revealed only a significant two-way interaction between Target and Gender 
Typicality, B = 6.27, SE = 2.58, t(10996.91) = 2.43, p = .015, 95% CIs [1.22, 11.32] (see Figure 
10). This two-way interaction was decomposed by examining the effect of Gender Typicality in 
the Majority Men and Majority Women arrays. Results, using custom contrasts (i.e., matrix(c(0, 
0, 0, 2, [2 or -2]), 1), revealed that in the Majority Women arrays, there was no significant effect 
of Gender Typicality, B = -5.57, SE = 7.14, z = -0.78, p = .435, 95% CIs [-19.56, 8.43] however 
for the Majority Men arrays, there was a significant effect of Gender Typicality, B = 19.51, SE = 
7.43, z = 2.63, p = .009, 95% CIs [4.94, 34.07], such that participants were faster to categorize 
masculine men arrays (M = 999.55, SE = 13.68) compared to feminine men arrays (M = 
1020.91, SE = 13.70). These findings align with hypotheses such that when visual gender 
typicality information was most present (majority men groups), this visual cue information 
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resulted in faster categorizations when cues aligned (i.e., masculine men) compared to when they 
misaligned (i.e., feminine men).  
Figure 10. Reaction times to categorize target by Trial Type (Majority Men, Majority Women) 
and Men’s Gender Typicality (Masculine, Feminine). *p < .05 
 
Spatial Attraction. To assess spatial attraction, I followed standard procedures (Hehman 
et al., 2015), scaling mouse  trajectories onto a standard coordinate space (top-left: “-1, 1.5”; 
bottom-right: “1, 0”) with the bottom center at the “0, 0” trial starting position. Additionally, the 
trajectories were fit to 101-time steps series with linear interpolation. To assess the degree to 
which “incorrect” category activation emerged (e.g., a majority feminine men group showing 
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greater partial activation to the “mostly women” label compared to a majority masculine men 
group) I calculated, by trial, the area-under-the-curve (AUC). This AUC consists of finding the 
maximum deviation, and then taking the area between the idealized response (i.e., a straight 
direct line to the correct category label) and the actual mouse trajectory. 
I hypothesized that when categorizing groups with manipulated visual gender typicality 
cues most present (e.g., majority men arrays), misaligned gender typicality would create greater 
opposite category attraction, that is majority feminine men groups should have higher AUC than 
majority masculine men groups. 
There were 406 trials which exceeded three SD above the mean (MAUC = 0.43, SDAUC = 
1.11) and thus these trials were excluded. Results from a full model (random intercept and 
random slope for Target and Duration) revealed no significant three-way interaction for Target, 
Gender Typicality, and Duration, B = 0.01, SE = 0.01, t(10745.14) = 1.24, p = .217, 95% CIs [-
0.01, 0.02] as well as no significant interaction between Duration and Target (p = .066) and 
Duration and Gender Typicality (p = .646). Thus, as with reaction times, I reported the model 
results without the interaction terms for Duration. 
Results from this reduced model (random intercepts and random slopes for Target and 
Duration) revealed a significant effect of Duration, B = -0.08, SE = 0.01, t(84.15) = -8.61, p 
< .001, 95% CIs [-0.10, -0.06] such that participants who viewed arrays for longer durations had 
more direct categorizations compared to participants who viewed the arrays for shorter durations. 
Results also revealed a significant two-way interaction between Target and Gender Typicality, B 
= 0.02, SE = 0.01, t(10752.07) = 2.57, p = .010, 95% CIs [0.004, 0.03]. This two-way 
interaction (see Figure 11) was broken down by separately examining the effect of Gender 
Typicality in the Majority Men and Majority Women arrays. Results, using custom contrasts 
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(i.e., matrix(c(0, 0, 0, 2, [2 or -2]), 1), revealed that in the Majority Women arrays, there was no 
significant effect of Gender Typicality, B = -0.03, SE = 0.02, z = -1.52, p = .129, 95% CIs [-
0.07, 0.01] however for the Majority Men arrays, there was a significant effect of Gender 
Typicality, B = 0.04, SE = 0.02, z = 2.10, p = .035, 95% CIs [0.003, 0.09] such that participants 
had higher AUCs when categorizing feminine men arrays (M = 0.24, SE = 0.02) compared to 
masculine men arrays (M =0.19, SE = 0.02). These findings align with hypotheses such that 
when visual cue information was most present (majority men groups), this visual cue information 
resulted in greater attraction to the incorrect category label when cues misaligned (i.e., feminine 
men) compared to when cues aligned (i.e., masculine men).   
Figure 11. Area Under the Curve (AUC) by Trial Type (Majority Men, Majority Women) and 
Men’s Gender Typicality (Masculine, Feminine). *p < .05. 
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Discussion 
 Study Set 2 examined people construal processes related to social category activation and 
social category decision making. In Study 5, by utilizing a sequential priming paradigm, I 
assessed the degree to which group primes varying in visual cues to men’s gender typicality (i.e., 
masculine/feminine) and majority group gender (i.e., majority men/majority women) facilitated 
category priming. Results revealed that group gender typicality impacted subsequent category 
activation when shown for a short duration and for groups with majority men (i.e., when cues 
should be most utilized, Macrae & Martin, 2007). Specifically, majority masculine men group 
primes facilitated category activation as indicated by faster reaction times to categorize a 
subsequently presented man’s face, compared to majority feminine men group primes. Study 6 
further demonstrated the role of men’s gender typicality on participants’ social category 
decisions about groups. Participants, when categorizing a majority masculine men group, 
compared to a majority feminine men group, had fewer errors, faster reaction times, and more 
direct social categorizations. Together, these converging results provide evidence that visual 
gender cues affect social category activation processes associated with groups. 
Study Set 2 further situates people construal within established person construal 
frameworks, advancing our understanding of the visual perception of groups as it relates to social 
category-based processes. While Studies 1-4 focused on numeric estimations and trait 
evaluations of briefly presented groups, Studies 5 and 6 examined how the social categories 
depicted within a group activate and facilitate social categorization. Through both a traditional 
sequential priming task and a mouse-tracking paradigm results converge on the notion that 
perceivers integrate visual cues to gender typicality when making assessments regarding groups. 
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Specifically, when social category information (e.g., men) aligns with visual cue information 
(e.g., masculine men), perceivers social category activation was facilitated across numerous 
dependent measures (e.g., reaction time, errors, directness), yet misalignment of these cues 
hindered category activation and categorization. 
Findings did reveal some noteworthy unpredicted effects. From Study 5, results showed 
that perceivers, regardless of men’s gender typicality, showed facilitated categorization of a 
man’s face following majority women group primes. Since these groups have fewer men within 
them, 3 out of 12 faces, it makes sense men’s gender typicality should not impact results. 
However, since the remaining 9 faces are all of women, majority women groups should facilitate 
categorization of women’s, not men’s, faces. I hypothesized that this divergence could be 
attributed to shifting men’s gender typicality, since this change could draw attention to the men’s 
faces throughout the perceptual process, especially compared to the relatively static gender 
typicality of women’s faces (e.g., all were feminine). Still, follow-up tests should explore this 
notion, possibly by varying women’s gender typicality and keeping men’s gender typicality 
constant. In this case, majority men groups should facilitate categorization of women’s faces 
because attention is drawn to the women’s shifting gender typicality.  
Also, results from Study 6, while indicative of gender typicality impacting participants 
categorical decisions, did not show interactive effects with stimulus presentation timing, at least 
for reaction times and area-under-the curve. It may be the case that timing effects specifically 
impact a prime/target relationship (e.g., see a prime then make a decision about a subsequent 
target) rather than a pure categorization process (e.g., categorize this target). The change in the 
nature of the task could have affected how participants utilized and integrated these cues, 
however the fact that the pattern of results across both studies was indicative of gender typicality 
 73 
affecting performance is still noteworthy as it suggests integration of these cues when visually 
processing groups. 
CONCLUSION 
Our social environments are full of people—co-workers mingling in an office, strangers 
filing into a movie theatre, students strolling on a college campus. Person perception research has 
long noted that we effortlessly and efficiently sort these people into social categories, which 
allows for an efficient interpretation of their relevance, motives, emotions, thoughts, and actions 
(Bruner, 1957; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). As the nomenclature 
suggests, person perception largely treats the person as the object of focus, examining how we 
come to perceive each individual person within the sea of people. Dating back to Gesalt 
psychology (Asch, 1946) we know, however, that the whole equals more than the sum of its 
parts, and my dissertation focused on the larger percept of groups. In proposing and developing a 
theory of people construal, or how we perceive, evaluate, and make sense of groups within our 
social world, I integrated social cognition and person construal theory with novel findings from 
vision science on ensemble perception, to propose and evaluate unique hypotheses about group 
perception, judgment, and social categorization. 
First, I found that perceivers were sensitive to social category differences (i.e., gender) 
within twelve person groups and that these differences in turn affected explicit and more implicit 
group evaluations. Specifically, as the gender ratio within a group shifted from predominately 
women to predominately men, participants reported seeing more men within the group and rated 
the group as more threatening/hostile and less warm/inviting, aligning with gender stereotype 
associations. Critically, these results emerged following a very brief visual presentation of the 
group—500 ms for explicit ratings and 75 ms for the AMP—highlighting the efficiency of our 
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categorical and evaluative group judgments. Additionally, I showed that participants estimated 
number of men mediated group threat judgments, further highlighting the impact of perceived 
social categories on group social evaluations. 
Second, I tested whether perceivers were sensitive to within-category variability (i.e., 
gender typicality) for visually perceived groups, and if these visual cues affected group 
evaluative judgments. To test these questions, I generated a novel stimulus set of masculine and 
feminine men using face morphing, and then created groups with these faces. Thus, I varied both 
the representation of social categories (i.e., how many men and women were in a group) and the 
visual cues that denote gender (i.e., whether the men in the group were masculine or feminine). 
Results from Study 4 demonstrated that perceivers were sensitive to cues of men’s facial gender 
typicality and that these cues impacted categorical, perceptual, and evaluative judgments. That is, 
as the number of men to women in a group increased, if the men within the group were 
masculine, compared to feminine, participants rated the group as having more men, as being 
more masculine, and as more threatening. These findings provided a more nuanced perspective 
into how we perceive and integrate not only social categories within groups but also the visual 
cues underlying social category perception of groups. 
Finally, in Study Set 2, I directedly assessed social category activation and social 
categorization processes for groups varying in gender ratio and men’s gender typicality. In Study 
5, I conceptually replicated Macrae and Martin (2007)’s work which showed that by varying 
prime duration (i.e., a short versus a long prime), one can tease apart the role of social category 
(i.e., gender) and visual feature cues (i.e., long/short hair), such that visual features, at a short 
prime duration, can override social category information (e.g., a woman with short hair 
facilitated activation of men, not women). While results did not show a reversal in category 
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activation for groups, the pattern of findings did suggest that visual cues within groups were 
utilized. Specifically, for the short prime duration, majority masculine men group primes, 
compared to majority feminine men group primes, facilitated faster reaction times to categorize a 
subsequently presented face as a man. Thus, when visual cue information should be most 
impactful (i.e., short prime, majority men), gender typicality cues impacted category accessibility 
as assessed through reaction times to categorize a target as a man. Finally, Study 6 examined the 
role of visual cues, again men’s gender typicality, on social categorization judgments as these 
decisions unfolded over time. Using a mouse-tracking paradigm, I assessed participants 
categorization of groups (i.e., whether a group was majority men or women) that varied in men’s 
gender typicality. Results again suggested that perceivers were sensitivity to visual cue 
information, with majority feminine men groups producing more errors in categorization, slower 
reaction times to categorize, and less direct categorization (i.e., greater area-under-the-curve), 
compared to majority masculine men groups. Together, these results demonstrated perceivers’ 
sensitivity to visual cue information (i.e., men’s gender typicality), over and above social 
category differences (i.e., dominant gender within the group), revealing the critical role for both 
categorical and visual phenotypic information in people construal. 
The Social Vision of Groups 
By situating this work at the intersection of social cognition research on person construal 
and vision science research on ensemble perception I aimed to build an integrated understanding 
of how we come to perceive and make judgments about groups. Ensemble perception (Whitney 
& Leib, 2018) provided the foundational evidence that perceivers were capable of group 
perception. Early work in this area approached these questions by testing low-level stimuli, 
addressing the accuracy of ensemble perception and establishing ensemble perception as a means 
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to overcome known limitations in terms of object perception (typically set at 3-4 objects, see 
(Luck & Vogel, 1997; Rensink, et al., 2000; Scholl & Pylyshyn, 1999; Simons & Chabris, 1999). 
By expanding an “object” to include not only one thing but a group of things these researchers 
outlined a parsimonious way to explain how we adeptly perceive and move through our complex 
sensory world (Whitney & Leib, 2018). While vision scientists increasingly addressed more 
socially relevant stimuli including faces, bodies, and eye-gaze (Haberman & Whitney, 2007; 
Sweeny, et al., 2013; Sweeny & Whitney, 2014; Thornton et al., 2014), methodological 
differences such as few participants (offset by a large number of trials) and tight control over 
stimuli (frequently utilizing a small set of faces) meant the critical focus of this work largely 
centered on perceptual processes and accuracy. While vital to establishing the capability and 
operation of group perception, my dissertation studies resituated ensemble perception by 
focusing on the socio-functional, ecological aspects of perceiving people (McArthur & Baron, 
1983), addressing questions not just of how we perceive groups but to what end and why.  
In addressing questions regarding the functional purpose of people construal, it was 
critical to examine tenants from the rich history of person construal. Throughout the presented 
studies, a number of these tenants guided and were upheld by my research. Of critical 
importance were processes associated with social categorization, both the use of social categories 
and how these social categories activated stereotypic knowledge which, in turn, affected 
downstream evaluations of groups. It is these processes that informed why a group of majority 
men would be associated with more threat than a group of majority women (Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990; Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Hamilton, 1981; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Additionally, 
the Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person Construal (Freeman & Ambady, 2011) highlighted the 
need to examine not just social categories but also the bottom-up visual cues to those social 
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categories. Again, findings paralleled past research, with visual cues to men’s gender typicality 
impacting estimates of the number of men, overall average gender typicality, and trait 
evaluations (Study 4). Perceivers’ social categorization processes were also impacted by such 
bottom-up cues, as shown by the pattern of results for priming facilitated category activation and 
categorization decisions of groups (Studies 5, 6).  
Overall, this work on people construal represents a novel domain for understanding our 
daily perception not only of the individual but also individuals with individuals. While it is likely 
that tenants of person construal research will continue to be upheld when applied to groups, 
group perception research will also lead to a modification and extension of person construal 
theory. Simply the fact that we are sensitive to group social category variability (both across 
categories and within categories) after seeing a group for only half a second is astonishing yet 
resonates with our lived experience of seeing groups, crowds, and people. It is also telling that 
these lower level percepts appear to be the factor behind our group trait evaluations, more so at 
least than higher-order thinking about a group (i.e., entitativity) at least for quick and repeated 
group judgments (Study 3). Findings from Study Set 2 also both replicate and diverge from prior 
research. While it is clear visual cues to gender typicality were utilized both in the priming 
paradigm (Study 5) and for categorization decisions (Study 6), it is also clear that they operate 
differently compared to person perception. While hairstyle cues and visual gender typicality are 
clearly different, I did not find a complete reversal of priming effects in Study 5, as suggested by 
Macrae and Martin (2007). Perhaps more interesting was the divergence when it came to 
majority women groups, which appeared to show category facilitation to men compared to 
women’s faces, regardless of duration and men’s gender typicality within the array. As noted, the 
fact that men within the group were changing on a constant basis between masculine and 
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feminine might have cued participants to focus on the men, leading to facilitation of men as the 
category, regardless of gender typicality and the dominant social category within the group (i.e., 
women). Still, these findings suggest unique effects of seeing such change within a group, a fact 
illuminated only by focusing on groups as category primes.  
Future Directions & Limitations 
 The domain of people construal is rich in opportunities to test novel questions about the 
perception of groups. As future research continues, I envision three areas of critical importance. 
First, and perhaps most obvious, it is important to understand how group perception operates for 
a variety of social categories as well as the interaction of these social categories. By testing both 
single social category variability (e.g., race, age), within-social category variability (e.g., racial 
phenotypically) and intersectional social category variability (e.g., race and gender) novel 
insights may be gained regarding our perception of people.  
Second, there is still much to be known about the exact process by which visual 
information about groups is integrated and consolidated into a group percept. Research from 
vision science on ensemble perception is still developing and continued integration between 
vision science and social psychology is critical to advancing a cogent theory of people construal. 
Two relevant and novel findings from ensemble perception are how sequential percepts (e.g., 
showing images one after another, rather than as a group) can also be accurately summarized and 
how changes in group size (e.g., adding or subtracting elements from a group) may affect group 
perceptions.  
Lastly, it is important to explore more applied aspects of people construal, taking an 
ecological perspective (McArthur & Baron, 1983) to ask why group perception matters in the 
first place. I believe, group perception offers critical insights into a variety of applied social 
 79 
psychological applications such as understanding group representativeness and the development 
of interventions. Here, I spend the rest of this section developing these future directions, 
highlighting specific areas to direct future work.  
The Who’s Who within the Group. As this was an initial foray into people construal, I 
purposefully limited stimuli to White men and women. In doing so, however, this research fell 
into the dominant paradigm of researching the default category—White individuals when 
varying gender (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Clearly other perceptually obvious social 
categories such as race and age, and even some “perceptually ambiguous” categories such as 
sexual orientation, are perceivable from the face and of great importance (Milord, 1978; Macrae 
& Bodenhausen, 2000; Tskhay & Rule, 2013). Simple extensions to this research call for varying 
the social categories depicted within groups and testing whether similar stereotyped evaluations 
emerge. Examining differences in stereotype activation and application for groups compared to 
individuals also suggest some intriguing possibilities. For instance, Cooley and Payne (2018) 
show that Black and Asian individuals were rated more stereotypically when in groups of other 
Black and Asian faces then when presented by themselves. These effects suggest that groups 
play a critical role in modulating our evaluations of individuals, and how stereotypes may 
become activated and applied to affect evaluations.  
Furthermore, it is important to examine the intersection of social categories. As prior 
work demonstrates race and gender are tethered with both bottom-up visual cues such as facial 
gender typicality (Carpinella, et al., 2015; Johnson, Freeman, et al., 2012) and top-down 
stereotypic associations (Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013) showing significant overlap. Social 
vision research has indicated that such overlap produces unique effects on social categorization, 
such that Asian men and Black women are categorized less efficiently because of contrasting 
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racial and gender stereotype roles (e.g., the category Black is associated with masculinity, which 
is at odds with the category women, Carpinella, et al., 2015; Johnson, Freeman, et al., 2012). 
Taking this a step further, intersectional invisibility argues that the default for Asian is a woman 
and the default for Black is a man, with findings from paradigms like Who-Said-What 
supporting these categorical defaults through the pattern of errors that emerge (Sesko & Biernat, 
2010; Schug, Alt, & Klauer, 2015). While the intersection of social categories leads to an 
exponential increase in the degree of complexity, one potential future study could examine 
whether Black women and Asian men may be less influential on questions related to gender 
numeric estimations compared to groups composed of Black men and Asian women. If true, this 
finding would give greater credence to intersectional invisibility when it comes to group 
percepts. A further extension may be examining the mean or average percept of a group’s gender 
typicality. To a purely rational observer, groups composed of equal numbers of Black men and 
women (6 Black women:6 Black men) should have equal gender mean summations as groups 
composed of Asian men and Asian women (6 Asian men: 6 Asian women), however the 
tethering of race and gender suggest that this would not be the case, with the Asian group skewed 
more feminine and the Black group skewed more masculine. Overall, the expansion of social 
categories within group percepts results in a multitude of novel extensions to develop both 
ensemble perception as well as social vision theory. 
 A theme of my dissertation is the importance of visual cues to social categories in 
addition to the social categories themselves. As shown in Studies 4-6 visual cues to gender 
typicality were discernable within groups and impacted evaluations of the group as a whole. One 
omission from the present work is the role of gender typicality for faces of women. While I 
hypothesize that gender typicality should operate in a similar fashion (e.g., groups composed of 
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masculine women will be perceived as having fewer women and be rated as more threatening, 
compared to groups composed of feminine women), it is also likely the case that these effects 
will not be as strong as when gender and gender typicality match (e.g., a group of masculine 
women should not lead to even higher ratings of threat compared to a group of masculine men). 
Even more complex are the possible iterations of groups composed of men and women who vary 
in gender typicality. For instance, what would be the effect of a group of masculine men and 
feminine women compared to a group of feminine men and feminine women, or feminine men 
and masculine women on social evaluations and social categorical outcomes. These 
combinations lead to interesting divergent and interactive hypotheses between ensemble 
perception research and social cognition. On one hand, ensemble perception would hypothesize 
that on a continuum of summary gender representations (such as the gender typicality face scale 
used in Study 4), masculine men/masculine women and feminine men/feminine women groups 
would anchor extreme group masculinity and extreme group femininity, respectively. It is less 
clear however where groups of masculine men/feminine women and feminine men/masculine 
women would fall along such a continuum. While a purist would suggest they should fall at 
roughly the same spot, social psychological theory would suggest that gender atypical men and 
women are not weighted equally (Glick, Gangl, Gibb, Klumpner, & Weinberg, 2007) and as 
such, differences in outcomes may emerge. Similar examination of visual cues to racial 
phenotypically, as well as the intersection of gender and race open a host of questions regarding 
the impact of visual cues on group perception. Overall, it is no longer the case that group 
differences can be thought of in terms of monolithic category differences, and instead within-
group variability is a critical element to examine in people construal.  
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Continued Integration with the Field of Ensemble Perception. The field of ensemble 
perception is still relatively nascent with novel findings emerging about both low-level and more 
socially relevant group stimuli. Of particular interest is recent work showing that perceivers who 
viewed serially presented photos, that is in sequence one after the other rather than as a single 
group, reported accurate summary representations about the “group” as a whole (Hubert-
Wallander & Boynton, 2015). This slight change in how ensemble perception was tested has 
ramifications that parallel technological advances of today, such as “new feeds” viewed on a 
cellphone or profile pictures viewed on common dating apps. This sequential ensemble 
perception suggests that even when people are presented one after another, a group percept may 
still be available to perceivers. From a social psychological perspective this has strong 
implications for how a prototype about a certain group of people might develop across time and 
experience (see Tong, Dubé, & Sekuler, 2019). 
 The integration of ensemble perception and person construal theories also suggests 
possibilities with how group percepts are continually updated. Indeed, a critical, yet 
understudied, element of social vision models such as the Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person 
Construal (Freeman & Ambady, 2010) is that the social perception of others occurs in an 
iterative fashion and updates throughout the temporal sequence (e.g., the processing of fleeting 
facial emotions). While socially perceived characteristics about groups certainly change over 
time (e.g., the age of a group of friends), groups themselves can also change, with new members 
added and old members dropping out. We likely do not hold a static, un-updatable representation 
of groups; however little research has examined how such updating might occur for people 
construal and to what effect. This offers a unique window into how both ensemble perception 
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updates (Whitney & Leib, 2018) and what the resultant effects will be for how we perceive and 
evaluate a group. 
Implications of People Construal. The act of consciously thinking about visually 
perceived groups entails interpreting or making some meaning out of that visual perception 
(Bruner, 1957; McArthur & Baron, 1983). In my dissertation studies I presented evidence that 
our perception of a groups gender composition serves as a means of evaluating that group’s level 
of threat or their capacity to do harm. In other work, my collaborators and I showed that 
perceiving a group’s gender ratio interacted with one’s own gender identity to impact evaluations 
of fit and belonging within the group (Goodale, Alt, Lick, & Johnson, 2018). A similar finding 
would likely emerge for differences in other social categories such as race, with implications for 
underrepresented minorities in classrooms and college campuses. The integration of people 
construal with other established research domains such as stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 
1995) would be fruitful for developing a holistic theory of how minorities perceptual experience 
of others and their environment translates into negative outcomes (see Murphy, Steele, & Gross, 
2007). As research into people construal continues it will be important to remain focused on the 
social implications and potential for interventions surrounding group perception. 
 The second half of my dissertation largely focused on the impact of bottom-up visual 
cues (i.e., gender typicality) and their independent and interactive effects with social categories 
to affect group evaluations and group categorization processes. It is important to recognize that 
the Dynamic Interactive Theory of Person Construal (Freeman & Ambady, 2011) posits that top-
down cognitive and motivational factors also affect how we perceive individuals, and it is likely 
the case that these factors also play a role in our perception and social judgments about people. 
One extension building towards this theoretical point would be to examine how individual 
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differences in attitudes about and motivations towards women and racial minorities would 
impact perceptual estimations and group evaluations. In fact, aligning with recent work by 
Cooley and Payne (2017, 2018), it may be the case that individual differences in attitudes held 
about a group (e.g., global attitudes about Black Americans) would be even more predictive of 
attitudes about a perceived group of Black men compared to an individual Black man as the 
group percept may serve as a means of removing the “individuating” processes potentially 
applicable to the social perception of an individual (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). This could have 
strong implications for understanding what the effects would be of depicting an individual versus 
a group, and to what end these different portrayals might serve.  
Other top-down factors of interest include the role of knowledge surrounding the context 
in which a group is perceived. As Freeman, Ma, Han and Ambady (2013) demonstrated, the 
background image (e.g., stereotypically American or Chinese) affected social categorization 
decisions of Asian and White faces as assessed via mouse-tracking. They found that an 
American background led to less direct categorizations of Asian faces and a Chinese background 
led to less direct categorizations of a White face. Applied to groups, I hypothesize that contextual 
factors such as knowing whether a classroom is associated with STEM versus non-STEM may 
bias the estimated number of women or racial minorities within the class, ultimately affecting 
beliefs about representation and even performance within such settings (Murphy et al., 2007). 
On-going work is also examining how identity and attitudinal differences may impact numeric 
estimations within a group, with results showing a tendency by White Americans to over-
estimate the number of Black men, compared to White men, in briefly presented, large 100 
person groups and for White Americans to be relatively poor at gauging whether their in-group 
(White individuals) are in the racial majority or minority when viewing groups composed of 70% 
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racial minorities, 30% Whites (Alt, Chaney, & Johnson, in prep; Alt, Does,& Shih, in prep). In 
sum, this preliminary evidence suggests that people construal processes likely mirror person 
construal processes regarding the impact of top-down factors on group perception.  
Conclusion 
 In summary, the studies presented in this dissertation integrate novel findings from vision 
research on ensemble perception with social psychological theory on person construal to develop 
and explore our understanding of how we visually perceive and draw inferences about groups of 
people. In developing a theory of people construal, I investigated and found evidence for three 
critical aspects; first, that perceivers were sensitive to visually depicted group gender ratio and 
that judgments of groups tracked gender stereotype associations (i.e., the more a group shifted 
from women to men, the higher the threat evaluations of the group). Second, I showed that 
perceivers were sensitive to both category differences (i.e., men and women) and within-
category variability (i.e., gender typicality) as assessed by numeric estimations, average gender 
typicality, and trait evaluations. And third, I found that social category facilitation occurred 
following group primes when gender and gender typicality aligned, leading to faster reaction 
times to categorize a subsequent face as a man. Furthermore, tracking perceivers categorical 
decisions as they unfolded over time revealed that visual cue and social category alignment 
produced fewer errors, and faster, more direct, group categorizations. These studies all build new 
knowledge around a critical yet under-investigated visual percept—groups—showcasing points 
of convergence and divergence with past models of person perception (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; 
Freeman & Ambady, 2011; Hamilton, 1981; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000) and ensemble 
perception (Whitney & Leib, 2018) to advance theory and research on people construal.  
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